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I. Introduction
Racecar driver Scott Tucker leads an opulent life, which
includes enjoying an $8 million vacation home in Colorado, to which
he travels by a $13 million Lear Jet.1 Much of Tucker’s vast wealth
1.

David Heath, Payday Lending Bankrolls Auto Racer’s Fortune, IWATCH
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has been amassed through internet payday lending businesses,
which he operates from his office in Overland Park, Kansas.2 He
evades state lending laws by partnering with Indian tribes with
tribal sovereign immunity, yet the contrast between his lifestyle and
the tribes with which he partners could hardly be more stark.3
These partnerships call into question who actually controls these
loan businesses and whether they represent a legitimate use of the
sovereign immunity tribes have worked so hard to protect.
This Article discusses the most recent incarnation of payday
lending regulation-avoidance, which pits tribal sovereign immunity
against meaningful consumer protection laws. Under this model,
known among internet payday lenders as the “tribal sovereignty”
model, existing payday lenders team with Indian tribes in order to
gain the benefit of tribal sovereign immunity and avoid state usury
laws, small loan regulations, and payday loan laws.4 This practice
could conceivably weaken both tribal sovereignty and consumer
protection in one fell swoop.
For Indian tribes, sovereignty is a fundamentally important
concept. Tribal sovereignty is retained from prior to European
contact, but is subject to the power of Congress.5 Sovereignty is a
tribe’s power to self-govern and functions as a barrier to the
encroachment of foreign authority on Indian reservations.6
Sovereign immunity is a corollary of tribal sovereignty, and protects
tribes from enforcement of state law.7
Consumer protection is also a matter of deep significance to
many Americans, particularly in this historic time of deregulated
interest rates, complex consumer credit products, and record debt
levels. One context in which consumer regulation has been difficult
NEWS (Sept. 26, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.iwatchnews.org/2011/09/26/6605/
payday-lending-bankrolls-auto-racers-fortune (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See infra notes 143–50 and accompanying text (discussing the typical
sovereign model of partnerships between payday lenders and tribes).
5. See infra Part IV.A–B (discussing the history and limits of tribal
sovereignty).
6. Id.
7. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the basic principles of sovereign
immunity).
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to achieve is that of payday loans, high-interest products marketed
for short-term use, but more typically used for very long periods of
time, during which consumers often pay ten times what they
borrowed and have difficulty exiting the loans. Payday lenders are
adept at avoiding any regulations states pass, and there is no
federal law regulating most of the terms of payday loans. Thus, in
the rare instances in which states pass meaningful payday loan
regulations, lenders quickly find new ways to avoid those state laws.
This Article explores how tribal sovereign immunity is being
used in the context of payday lending to avoid state law and
explores the ramifications of this for both consumer-protection
regulation and tribes. It discusses payday loans and tribal
sovereignty generally, as well as tribal sovereign immunity, then
discusses what might be done to address this consumer protection
issue. More specifically, we discuss who in society has the power and
resolve to dissolve this alliance, identifying tribes themselves, the
Supreme Court, Congress, the Federal Trade Commission, and the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as possibilities.
We summarize the debate about whether payday lending
regulation will cause more harm than good by depriving the poor of
much-needed capital,8 and recount examples of state regulatory
efforts that have taken place. We describe the ways that lenders are
teaming with tribes to avoid that regulation, and then discuss the
long-term implications of these developments, both for consumer
protection and for tribal sovereignty.
II. Background on the Economics of Tribal Life
Some journalists with a consumer protection bent have painted
tribes as the greedy beneficiaries of these high interest loans,
conjuring up images of a gloating tribal member getting rich off the
non-tribal poor.9 In reality, this is simply not true. First, Native
8. Though we believe meaningful payday loan regulation is sorely needed,
this paper does not focus its attention on this issue.
9. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Tribes Profit on Payday-Loan Rules,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2011, at C1 (reporting on the growth of the “sovereign-loan
model” and the economic incentives it brings to tribes). But see Michael Hudson
& David Heath, Fights Over Tribal Payday Lenders Show Challenges of
IWATCH
NEWS
(Feb.
7,
2011,
9:13
AM),
Financial
Reform,
http://www.iwatchnews.org/2011/02/07/2151/fights-over-tribal-payday-lenders-
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people also use these loans. In one recent case, a New Mexico
woman borrowed $5,000 under a loan that required she pay back
$42,000.10 Second, in many of these lender–tribe partnerships, tribal
sovereignty is being used in ways that benefit only non-tribal
individuals. Thus, characterizations like those in the popular media
are almost completely false. These false characterizations could
cause short-term and long-term harm to tribes, by painting an
inaccurate economic picture, and even by threatening tribal
independence and sovereignty itself.
To understand the importance of sovereignty from a tribal
perspective, one must also understand the economics for most
tribes. Poverty is more prevalent among Native people than any
other American demographic.11 Following efforts by the federal
government and Euro-American settlers to dislocate and remove the
Indian tribes from their territories,12 many tribes now reside in
rural areas with limited development of natural resources.13
show-challenges-financial-reform (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (describing tribes’
willingness to profit from payday lending as a result of being “stripped of their
economic vitality and forced to relocate to remote wastelands”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Mark Fogarty, Payday Lenders ‘Using Tribes
as Fronts’, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 14, 2011),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/02/14/payday-lenders-‘usingtribes-as-fronts’-17421 (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (objectively reporting on the
publication of a report that investigates payday lender arrangements with
tribes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. Native Community Finance, a community development corporation
located on the Laguna Pueblo, recently provided a loan to pay off an internet
payday loan given by Western Sky Loans. Under the terms of the loan, the
consumer would have paid back $42,000 to borrow $5,000. The consumer told
the executive director of Native American Finance that she thought the loan
was O.K. because it was being offered by a tribe. See interview with Marvin
Ginn, Exec. Dir., Native Am. Fin. (Oct. 2, 2011).
11. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FUNDING
AND UNMET NEEDS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 8 (2003), available at http://www.usccr.
gov/pubs/na0703/na0204.pdf (“[T]he national poverty rate in the Unites States
for the period between 1999 and 2001 was 11.6 percent. For Native Americans
nationally, the average annual poverty rate was 24.5 percent.”).
12. See Kelly E. Yasaitis, NAGPRA: A Look Back Through the Litigation,
25 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 259, 260–61 (2005) (recounting the treatment
of Native Americans in the nineteenth and twentieth Centuries).
13. See Nancy B. Collins & Andrea Hall, Nuclear Waste in Indian Country:
A Paradoxical Trade, 12 LAW & INEQ. 267, 300 (1994) (describing tribal
involvement in nuclear waste as a result of “legal policies that created a system
of remote reservations, and restricted resource development”).
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Unemployment tops 50% in many areas,14 and access to quality
healthcare can be very limited.15 One significant bright light for
tribes in recent history has been economic development. Many
people, both Native and non-Native, think this may ameliorate
poverty and the social problems that accompany it. Nevertheless,
the stereotype of a tribe getting rich off casinos and paying no taxes
could hardly be further from the truth.16 Contrary to the popular
conception, most tribes are still poorer than other U.S. communities,
despite recent economic development.17

14. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 101 (noting that
unemployment has reached eighty-five percent on some reservations and that in
2000, unemployment on reservations was more than twice the national rate).
15. See Armen H. Merjian, Unbroken Chain of Injustice: The Dawes Act,
Native American Trusts, and Cobell v. Salazar, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 609, 611–12
(2010). As Professor Merjian states:
Native Americans are, in truth, among the very poorest Americans.
As the United States Civil Rights Commission explains, “Native
Americans still suffer higher rates of poverty, poor educational
achievement, substandard housing, and higher rates of disease and
illness. Native Americans continue to rank at or near the bottom of
nearly every social, health, and economic indicator.” Fully 23.6% of
Native Americans live below the poverty line, and 34% of Native
American children live in families with household incomes below the
poverty line. Roughly 90,000 Native American families are homeless
or under-housed, and nearly half of reservation households are
crowded or severely crowded. One in five of those houses lacks
adequate plumbing facilities.
Native Americans have a lower life expectancy than any other ethnic
group in the United States, and they suffer higher rates of illness for
many diseases. “On average, men in Bangladesh can expect to live
longer than Native American men in South Dakota.” Elderly Native
Americans are 48.7% more likely to suffer from heart failure, 173%
more likely to suffer from diabetes, and 44.3% more likely to suffer
from asthma than the general population. Meanwhile, one in three
Native Americans lacks health insurance coverage.
Id. (citations omitted).
16. See Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Reconciling the
Paradox of Tribal Sovereignty: Three Frameworks for Developing Indian
Gaming Law and Policy, 4 NEV. L.J. 262, 262–64 (2003) (discussing and
negating various popular media portrayals of Native Americans as wealthy
gaming tribes).
17. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 8 (“[T]he national
poverty rate in the Unites States for the period between 1999 and 2001 was 11.6
percent. For Native Americans nationally, the average annual poverty rate was
24.5 percent.”).
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Moreover, joint enterprises sometimes provide asymmetrical
economic gains for non-Native businesses while significant collateral
costs are borne by tribal lands and members. The costs borne by the
tribes can be of great consequence relative to the rewards.18 For
example, uranium mining has resulted in far fewer economic
benefits than anticipated, and has caused cancer and black lung
among Navajos who live and work near the mines.19 Uranium
mining is also ruinous to the surrounding land and groundwater.20
Some tribes have been convinced to take nuclear waste for disposal
on their lands, even though the compensation received is
significantly undermined by future health and environmental
ramifications, and by inherent risk.21 The tribal competitive
advantage in business often consists of providing an easier or less
18. Casinos are, overall, a significant economic boon to tribes, funding
tribal language revitalization programs, tribal cultural institutions, and schools,
among other programs. Yet, some argue that involvement with casinos can
sometimes chip away at ancient tribal customs. Others find nothing unusual
about casinos and find that they do not harm Native culture any more than any
other enterprise. See Karin Mika, Private Dollars on the Reservation: Will
Recent Native American Economic Development Amount to Cultural
Assimilation?, 25 N.M. L. REV. 23, 33 (1995) (“Tribes disagree on how much
cultural purity will be compromised by ‘nontraditional’ enterprises if outside
entities are allowed to develop businesses on reservation lands.”).
19. See Collins & Hall, supra note 13, at 294–95 (discussing the negative
health and environmental impacts of uranium mining on Native American
lands); see also Terri Hansen, Proposed Alaska Coal Mine Divides Alaska
Communities, Elicits Racist Rant, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK
(Sept. 19, 2011), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/09/proposedalaska-coal-mine-divides-alaska-communities-elicits-racist-rant/ (last visited
Apr. 10, 2012) (describing the negative impacts of mining on the health and land
of Alaskan tribes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Carol
Berry, Mining Clashed with Sacred Sites in 2010, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA
NETWORK (Dec. 27, 2010), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2010/12/
mining-clashed-with-sacred-sites-in-2010/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (reporting
on the potential environmental, health, and cultural damage caused by uranium
and coal mines) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); A Lump of
Coal for ANCs, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Dec. 27, 2010),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2010/12/a-lump-of-coal-for-ancs/
(last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (reporting on proposed legislation to address abuses
in preferential government contracts and quoting Senator McCaskill as saying,
“[w]e’ve seen that a very small portion of these companies’ profits are reaching
native Alaskans”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
20. See Collins & Hall, supra note 13, at 295 (explaining the environmental
impacts of uranium mining).
21. See id. at 274–75 (discussing the incentives and consequences to tribes
for accepting nuclear waste onto their land).
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costly regulatory environment in matters regulated by states.22
Moreover, it goes without saying that tribes are as diverse as any
group of people in the country, and there is naturally no consensus
among Native people about what constitutes good or bad economic
development.23 Off-reservation business activity can also cause
backlash from outsiders.24 It is from this social, historical, and
economic climate that the partnership between tribes and payday
lenders emerged.
III. Background on Payday Loans
A. Anatomy of a Payday Loan
A payday loan is a loan designed to get a consumer through a
short-term cash-flow shortage.25 These loans were originally created
in order to help consumers make ends meet between now and
payday, thus the descriptive name.26 In reality there are now many
varieties of short-term loans of this kind, and the loan terms vary
markedly. In one common example, a consumer borrows money at a
rate of between $15 and $25 per $100 for a period of fourteen days
or fewer.27 In other words, if a consumer got paid four days ago but
is already out of cash, she can go borrow, for example, $400 between
22. This is especially true of tribes that are economically vulnerable. Tribes
with more economic resources have more options: They are able to be more
discerning and to use the full range of their resources, including capital, to
create opportunities.
23. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Tribal Businesses and the OffReservation Market, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1047, 1049–50 (2008) (describing
various off-reservation businesses, the controversy behind these businesses, and
the possibility of backlash from the outside as a result).
24. See id.
25. See Ronald Mann & James Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 855, 857 (2007) (explaining the mechanics of a typical payday loan); Karen
E. Francis, Note, Rollover, Rollover: A Behavioral Law and Economics Analysis
of the Payday Loan Industry, 88 TEX. L. REV. 611, 611–12 (2010) (describing a
payday loan transaction).
26. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 25, at 857 (“The spirit of the market
is captured by a recent Cash America television advertisement advising that
‘some things can’t wait until payday.’”).
27. See Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A
Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 564 (2010)
(giving an example of a typical payday loan).
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now and her next payday (now ten days away). To get that $400 at
the $15-per-$100 rate, she will need to have a checking account and
will write a check, or authorize an automatic debit, for $460 postdated to her next payday.28 When payday comes, she can either let
the check or debit clear, or she can go in and pay another $60 to
borrow the same $400 for the next two weeks. Interest rates for
these loans range from around 400% per annum to over 1,200%, and
the industry is largely unregulated in most of the country.29 Payday
lending is one of the fastest growing segments of the consumer
credit industry.30 As Francis notes, “[b]y 2005, there were more
payday-loan stores in the United States than McDonald’s, Burger
King, Sears, J.C. Penney, and Target stores combined.”31
B. The Debate over Payday Lending Regulation
An active debate rages about whether these loans do more
harm than good. Consumer groups claim these loans create a debt
trap.32 Lender groups, perhaps with some justification, point out
that people of lesser means have no place else to go when they really
need cash.33 They claim that restricting access to the only source of
28. Id.
29. See id. at 565 (citing Felix Salmon, Loan Sharking Datapoints of the
Day, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2010, 7:37 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/felixsalmon/2010/01/07/loan-sharking-datapoints-of-the-day/ (last visited Apr. 10,
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
30. See Francis, supra note 25, at 618–19 (describing the growth of the
payday lending industry).
31. Id. at 619.
32. See LESLIE PARRISH & URIAH KING, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
PHANTOM DEMAND: SHORT-TERM DUE DATES GENERATE NEED FOR REPEAT PAYDAY
LOANS, ACCOUNTING FOR 76% OF TOTAL VOLUME 15–16 (2009), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/phantomdemand-final.pdf (demonstrating how the structure of payday loans creates a
debt-trap for borrowers); LAUREN K. SANDERS ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW
CENTER, STOPPING THE PAYDAY LOAN TRAP: ALTERNATIVES THAT WORK, ONES THAT
DON’T 4–6 (2010), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_
loans/payday_loans/report-stopping-payday-trap.pdf (describing payday loans
and the harms they cause for consumers); Francis, supra note 25, at 612
(describing how consumers may get “caught in the ‘debt trap’ of extending the
loan for multiple terms”).
33. See Francis, supra note 25, at 617 (noting that “the payday-lending
industry claims to provide a valuable service to consumers who are in need of
emergency cash and do not have access to other credit”); see also John P.
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capital for people of lesser means will only make people’s problems
worse.34
Some of the most harmful aspects of this problem have nothing
to do with interest rates and everything to do with how the loans are
marketed and used. We personally might look favorably upon a loan
product that allowed people who could not otherwise get credit to
borrow money for occasional, unexpected, non-recurring expenses.
Though some consumer groups disagree, we believe that this could
be a good and useful product even if it cost $25 for every $100
borrowed.35 In other words, the high relative cost of loans might not
matter so much if loans were truly short term, both in design and
marketing, as well as in actual use.
C. The Habits of Payday Lenders and Customers
In reality, these loans are rarely short term or occasional.
Empirical data show that the loans are often used habitually.36
Caskey, Payday Lending: New Research and the Big Question 3 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 10-32, 2010), available at
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/workingpapers/2010/wp10-32.pdf (noting that payday lenders serve people of lesser
means but not the very poor).
34. See Francis, supra note 25, at 613 (describing the arguments made by
proponents and critics of payday lending regulations).
35. Consumer groups object to payday lending for reasons other than the
high cost. As Jen Ann Fox of the Consumer Federation of America explained, in
response to this view:
We object to payday loan structure and design for many reasons other
than the cost, i.e. loans made without determination of ability to
repay, loans secured by access to bank accounts, balloon payment
loans, loans too large to be repaid out of one paycheck even if free,
loans based on unfunded checks leading to coercive debt collection
tactics, etc. As studies from the Center for Responsible Lending show,
even if the loans were used only now and then, this does not mean
that high cost is the only issue. If all the factors that go into a payday
loan resulted in only occasional use, this would not be a significant
problem, but these are not the same things.
Online interview with Ms. Fox (Oct. 18, 2011).
36. Caskey, supra note 33, at 4–5. Professor Caskey does a thorough review
of recent studies on repeat usage of payday loans, stating that:
Stegman’s 2007 article made this same point and provided data
indicating that many payday loan customers borrow repeatedly. More
recent data reinforce this finding. A study for the California
Department of Corporations found, for example, that 19 percent of
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According to one source, the average loan is rolled over ten times,
and some consumers pay on the same loan for years at a time.37
loan customers took out 15 or more loans over an 18- month period.
Only 16 percent took out just one. The study also included focus
groups with a small number of customers. Based on the focus groups,
the study reported, “When asked if they would recommend payday
loans to others, most indicated that they would provide the
information about payday lending, but would also provide cautions to
the ‘addictive’, ‘repetitive’, and ‘vicious’ cycle that can be a part of the
payday lending experience.” In Colorado during 2007, payday loan
customers with 12 or more loans accounted for 67 percent of all loans;
65 percent of loans were made on the same day that a customer
repaid a previous loan. As the Colorado report stated, “During 2007
the ‘average’ consumer paid about $573.06 in total finance charges to
have borrowed $353.88 for a period of little more than five and onehalf months at each . . . location with which that consumer did
business.”
Data from Florida indicate that the average number of transactions
per consumer from June 2008 through May 2009 was 8.4, and 30
percent of the customers in that ear had 12 loans or more. These 30
percent of customers accounted for 61 percent of all payday loans
made in that year. In Oklahoma, the average number of transactions
per customer was 9.3 from April 2008 through March 2009, 32.5
percent of the customers in that year took out 12 or more loans,
accounting for 63.5 percent of loan volume.
Id. (citations omitted).
37. See Allison Woolston, Note, Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be: The
Future of Payday Lending in Arizona, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 853, 867 (2010) (“This
repeated cycle of loan renewal extends the duration of payday loan to an
average of almost five months. The typical payday loan customer renews his
loan approximately ten times and, in one reported instance sixty-six times.”); see
also Francis, supra note 25, at 617. In this student note, Ms. Francis cites a
number of studies about rollovers being repeat loans, stating that:
The average borrower has 10, 11, or 12 payday transactions per year
according to three respective reports. A Colorado study found that the
average was greater than 9 transactions per year from the same
lender, but that did not include transactions that a borrower may
have had with other lenders, which the study implied could greatly
increase that average. In Illinois, 20% of borrowers have 20 or more
payday loans per year. A consumer advocate group found that 66%
incur at least 5 payday loans per year and that 31% receive more
than 12 per year. The Georgetown study reported that almost 50% of
borrowers had at least 7 transactions in the last year and that 22.5%
had more than 14 payday loans that year. Though none of the data
converged, all of these studies reveal a high rate of rollover
transactions per borrower. The striking feature of this data is that
the CFSA study, which should be most favorable to the paydaylending industry, shows that almost a majority of all borrowers are
rolling over their loans multiple times.
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Moreover, the loans are most frequently used to pay regular,
recurring bills like rent and utilities, not emergencies.38 This means
that once a person has borrowed the money, if he or she cannot pay
it back with the fee, he or she now has another monthly or
bimonthly bill to pay.
Perhaps not surprisingly, it is hard for a lender to make a profit
from occasional, non-recurring customers. Thus, lender marketing
typically encourages customers to use the loans for many nonemergency purposes. Advertisements suggest that the loans are a
perfect way to fund vacations,39 Christmas and birthday presents,
and even bachelor parties.40 In other words, while lenders claim that
they are here when tragedy hits and that their customers would be
harmed if they faced an emergency, many of the loans are used for
discretionary purposes at a cost that customers do not understand
until it is too late.
Similar to any product, gimmicks abound in payday loan
advertising. The idea is to attract new customers but to rely heavily
on repeat business.41 One payday lender uses stripper Bridget the
Midget as its mascot in order to demonstrate that the loans are for
Id. (citations omitted).
38. See Caskey, supra note 33, at 6 (describing a 2007 California survey
which found that “50.2 percent of loan customers said that they took the loan
primarily to pay bills, and 22.3 percent said that they mainly used it to buy
groceries or other household goods”) (citing APPLIED MGMT. & PLANNING GRP.,
2007 DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS PAYDAY LOAN STUDY 47 (2007), available at
http://www.corp.ca.gov/pub/pdf/PDLStudy07C.pdf). Martin has found that 63%
of customers reported using the loans for regular bills in her survey outside
store-front lenders’ places of business. Martin, supra note 27, at 608–09.
Another 4% reported using the loans for discretionary purposes such as gifts or
parties, and just 5% for emergencies, 5% for auto expenses, 5% to help family,
and 5% for medical expenses. Id.
39. See Using a Payday Loan for Vacation Expenses, PAYDAY LOAN BLOG
(Sept. 29, 2008, 10:19 AM), http://www.paydayloanaffiliate.com/blog/
UsingAPaydayLoanForVacationExpenses.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2012)
(advocating the use of a payday loan to fund a vacation) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
40. See Nathalie Martin, Funding Your Buddy’s Bachelor Party Through a
Payday Loan?, CREDIT SLIPS (Mar. 25, 2011, 6:32 PM), http://www.credit
slips.org/creditslips/2011/03/funding-your-buddys-bachelor-party-through-a-pay
day-loan.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (linking to a payday loan ad) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
41. See PARRISH & KING, supra note 32, at 2–3 (describing the “churning” of
borrows and noting that such churning accounts for three-fourths of all payday
loan volume).
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“short” term use.42 Despite the clever play on words, lenders dun
customers to take out new loans almost immediately after they pay
back an old one.43 Lenders call customers in their cars on their way
home from paying off or paying down the loan.44 Lenders waive one
two-week fee if you keep your loan out for four two-week cycles in a
row.45 In fact, if a customer can afford to pay back the whole loan,
without resorting to rollovers, lenders offer to increase the amount
enough to make sure that this never happens again. In other words,
lenders do whatever they legally can to make sure the loans are
neither infrequent nor short term.
Whatever problems are created by storefront payday loans, the
problems with internet payday loans appear to be far worse.
Interest rates are more commonly in the 600%–1,000% range,
rather than the 400%–600% range, and the loans are largely
unregulated.46 Some lenders who operate over the internet
consistently claim that they are not bound by any state’s law.47
Customers give large amounts of personal data to the lender over
the internet before they hear any of the loan terms.48 The lenders’
42. Little Payday, Bridget the Midget Introduces Small Loans at
LittlePayday.com!, YOUTUBE (Sept. 19, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
6euwvEQxm6c (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
43. See PARRISH & KING, supra note 32, at 2 (“Devoting [a] substantial
share of paycheck to repaying a payday loan, it appears, leaves most borrowers
inadequate funds for their other obligations, compelling them to take a new
payday loan almost immediately.”).
44. See Martin, supra note 27, at 574 (describing methods used by lenders
to encourage repeat borrowing).
45. See Allied Cash Advance Customer Loyalty Card (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
46. See CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., CFA SURVEY OF ONLINE PAYDAY LOAN
WEBSITES 5–6 (2011), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFAsurvey
InternetPaydayLoanWebsites.pdf (discussing APR disclosures and state
regulation of internet payday lenders); JEAN ANN FOX & ANNA PETRINI, INTERNET
PAYDAY LENDING: HOW HIGH-PRICED LENDERS USE THE INTERNET TO MIRE
BORROWERS IN DEBT AND EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 22 (2004),
available at http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/
finance/Internet_Payday_Lending113004.PDF (discussing the costs of internet
payday loans).
47. See CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., supra note 46, at 5 (describing
jurisdictional disclosures made by internet payday lenders).
48. See id. at 11–12 (describing the typical privacy policies of internet
payday lending websites).
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procedures make it extremely difficult to pay off the principal of the
loans rather than just the two-week fee.49 Recently, the Minnesota
Attorney General’s office sued five payday lenders for automatically
renewing loans and providing no meaningful procedure for paying
off loans in full.50
D. The Legal and Regulatory Framework of Payday Lending
As set out in this Article, internet payday lenders have a weak
history of complying with state laws. A 2004 survey of online
lenders demonstrates this point.51 Payday lenders are subject to
state laws that range from draconian—payday lending is a RICO
violation in Georgia—to permissive.52 The majority of states have
laws that specifically authorize payday lending.53 In recent years,
state regulators have brought enforcement actions against online
lenders that fail to comply with state laws, with the West Virginia
Attorney General’s office being among the most active.54 A 2011
survey of twenty internet payday lenders noted that a growing
number of websites post copies of their state licenses and claim to
make loans only in states where they are licensed.55 The most recent
survey by the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) notes that
lenders continue to claim choice of law from lax jurisdictions, to
49. See id. at 8–9 (describing internet payday loan payment terms and how
they result in a debt trap).
50. See
Minnesota
Sues
Five
Internet
Payday
Lenders,
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news
04/2011/09/minnesota-sues-five-internet-payday-lenders.html (last visited Jan.
7, 2011) (describing various consumer complaints about internet payday
lenders) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
51. See FOX & PETRINI, supra note 46, at 7–12 (discussing the ways in
which internet payday lenders evade state laws).
52. See Legal Status of Payday Lending by State, PAYDAY CONSUMER LOAN
INFORMATION, http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/legal-status (last visited Jan. 11,
2012) (summarizing state laws regarding payday lending) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
53. See id. (noting that thirty-three states permit payday lending with safe
harbor legislation).
54. See Press Release, Office of the W.Va. Att’y Gen. (Aug. 24, 2012),
available
at
http://www.wvago.gov/pdf/press/2011_onsumersfromDelaware
InternetPaydayLender.pdf (announcing the recovery of $300,000 from a
Delaware Internet lender for West Virginians).
55. FOX & PETRINI, supra note 46, at 5–6.
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locate off-shore, or to claim tribal sovereign immunity to avoid
complying with state consumer protections.56
There currently is no federal law regulating the specific terms
of these loans, although the Truth in Lending Act,57 the Electronic
Fund Transfer Act,58 and other general federal laws apply to online
lending. Moreover, many laws passed by states have been quickly
skirted by lenders, unless the law includes an interest rate cap.59
For example, in 2007, New Mexico passed a law that capped fees at
$15 per $100 borrowed for a period of up to two weeks;60 required
that lenders offer a free installment plan to any customer who could
not pay back a loan;61 prohibited all rollovers;62 limited loans to 25%
of a borrower’s gross income;63 and provided for a right of
rescission,64 among other limitations.65 This new law also provided
that all loans must go into a statewide database so these new
provisions could be enforced.66 Similar laws have been passed in
Florida, Oklahoma, Michigan, Illinois, North Dakota, and Indiana,

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 4.
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601–1667f (2012).
Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1693–1693r (2012).
See URIAH KING & LESLIE PARRISH, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
SPRINGING THE DEBT TRAP: RATE CAPS ARE ONLY PROVEN PAYDAY LENDING
REFORM 12–18 (2007), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/paydaylending/research-analysis/springing-the-debt-trap.pdf (describing how various
regulatory strategies have failed to stop the payday loan debt trap).
60. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-33(B) (West 2011).
61. Id. § 58-15-35(A).
62. Id. § 58-15-34(A).
63. Id. § 58-15-32(A). According to the Center for Responsible Lending,
income limit requirements do not necessarily help consumers avoid becoming
trapped in debt. KING & PARRISH, supra note 59, at 16. Because this income
restriction was based on the consumer’s gross income and thus on a dollar figure
that the consumer did not actually have available, it did not relate directly to
the consumer’s ability to repay the loan. Additionally, the income figure was for
an entire month but in most cases the term of the loan was for only two weeks,
meaning that the consumer only had half of the stated income with which to
attempt to repay the loan in any case. None of this makes any difference
anyway, because once the law was passed, lenders stopped making loans
covered by the new law and moved on to something else.
64. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-32(C) (West 2011).
65. See id. §§ 58-15-32 to 58-15-39 (enumerating all the requirements for
payday lending added in 2007).
66. Id. § 58-15-37.
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but lenders have quickly found ways to skirt the laws.67 Because a
last-minute definition added to the bill made the new law apply only
to loans of fourteen to thirty-five days in duration and those
involving a post-dated check, the industry quickly began selling a
product that fell outside the definition.68 In short, the new law
accomplished very little. The New Mexico law, like some others
around the country, capped interest rates at a generous 417%, yet
payday lenders still found reason to invent new products to skirt the
law.69
This is not to say that all states have been ineffective at
regulating payday loans, as the recent CFA study shows.70 State
interest rate caps have been very effective at eliminating payday
loan abuses,71 but even this solution may have met its match—tribal
sovereign immunity. Lenders make no secret about why they want
to team up with Indian tribes, as this advertisement for an internet
payday loan explains:
Due to the strict regulations that are hitting the payday loan
industry hard, many lenders are now turning to Indian Tribes to
help them out. The American Indian Tribes throughout the
United States have been granted sovereign immunity which
means that they are not held subject to the laws that payday
loans are currently going up against. There are 12 states which
have banned payday lending but as long as their (sic) is an Indian
tribe who runs the operation on this sovereign land, the lenders
can continue their business even where payday loans have
already been banned. Similar to the Casino boom, payday loans
are the new financial strategy that many are using as a loophole
through the strict payday loan laws. The revenue is quite high
and promising for these tribes who often find themselves
struggling. There are approximately 35 online cash advance and
payday loan companies that are owned by American Indian
67. See Martin, supra note 27, at 588–93 (describing how other states have
attempted and failed to successfully regulate and curb payday borrowing).
68. Id. at 585–86 (describing how lenders changed their product to fall
outside the definition of a payday loan).
69. Id. at 585.
70. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., SMALL DOLLAR LOAN PRODUCTS
SCORECARD—UPDATED 14–20 (2010), available at http://www.consumer
fed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/Updated_Scorecard.pdf
(grading
states based on whether they impose a 36% APR cap on small dollar loans).
71. See KING & PARRISH, supra note 59, at 19 (describing the success of
interest rate caps and listing the savings achieved by states that enforce an
interest rate cap).
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tribes. Consumers have taken out approximately 12,500 loans
over the last year in which these tribes made approximately $420
million. It is no surprise that many lending companies are
currently seeking out American Indian Tribes in an effort to save
their businesses by escaping US lending laws. Tribal leaders are
paid a few thousand dollars a month for allowing a payday lender
to incorporate on tribal land. The more lenders that tribes allow
to move onto their reservation, the larger the profit that they
make.72

This quote also explains that under this version of the tribal
affiliation model, tribes get the crumbs while the non-tribal
outsiders use their tribal sovereignty to make huge profits.
Moreover, as this advertisement makes clear, lenders using the
model described in the advertisement are by no means tribes
themselves. The next part of this Article analyzes whether these
practices entitle some payday lenders to tribal sovereign immunity,
and if so, which ones.
IV. Background on Sovereignty and Sovereign Immunity
A. Sovereignty Versus Sovereign Immunity
“There is nothing more important to Indian governments and
Indian people than sovereignty.”73 Tribal sovereignty is embodied in
hundreds of treaties between Indian nations and the colonial
powers,74 referenced in the U.S. Constitution, recognized by a vast
72. The Connection Between Indian Tribes and Payday Lending, ONLINE
CASH ADVANCE, http://www.online-cash-advance.com/financial-news/the-connectionbetween-indian-tribes-and-payday-lending#ixzz1Nt1vQu6h (last visited Jan. 11,
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
73. Framework of Tribal Sovereignty, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY CENTER,
http://www.americanindianpolicycenter.org/projects/marge1.html (last visited
Jan. 11, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
74. See FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 204–
24 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., Lexis Nexis 2005) (1941) (tracing the history
and extent of powers tribal powers and tribal sovereignty). When two
governments enter into a treaty with one another, they are recognizing each
other as sovereigns. For example, states generally enter into contracts with each
other that are called compacts. Treaties are the basis of the relationship
between tribes and the United States. Id. When the United States government
recognized tribes as sovereigns through treaties, they were following in the
footsteps of European nations that had done the same thing. Id. at 208.
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body of Supreme Court jurisprudence, and affirmed by numerous
laws.75 It is also referenced in the “Indians not taxed” provision of
the Constitution.76 The concept is so fundamental that it runs
through most legal scholarship on the subject of Indian law.77 Tribal
sovereignty predates both federal and state governments.78 Indian
governments have inherent sovereignty which is not derived from
any other government but rather from the people themselves.79
Despite this clear recognition of tribal sovereignty, Congress
and the Supreme Court have been chipping away at this principle
little by little, by limiting the regulatory power of tribes and the
jurisdiction of tribal courts. 80 In so doing, Congress and the
Supreme Court have systematically stripped tribes of the power to
control events taking place on their lands and taken away
affirmative governance powers.81 At the same time, the Supreme
Court has expanded tribal immunity, or protection from suit.82
According to one scholar, this combination of removal of governance
powers from tribes and concurrent expansion of immunity could
lead to a lack of government accountability, increased uncertainty
about the law, and increased animosity toward tribes among the
75. Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV.
799, 821–22 (2007).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned
among the several states according to their respective numbers . . . excluding
Indians not taxed.”).
77. There are three types of sovereigns in the United States, the federal
government, state governments, which derive their sovereignty from the federal
government, and Indian governments.
78. COHEN, supra note 74, at 204.
79. See id. at 205 (noting that tribes are distinct entities with powers of
self-government derived from original sovereignty rather than a delegation of
powers). To have any sovereign nation, you need a distinct, unique group of
people, who have a distinct language, a distinct moral and religious structure,
and a distinct cultural base. They must have a specific geographic area that
they control and regulate. Within that area, they must possess governmental
powers, including the power to tax and the power to change their government if
they see fit. These governmental powers must be acknowledged by the people
who are subject to them, and they must be enforceable by some sort of authority,
whether it be military, police, or general citizen control.
80. Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality,
Immunity, and the Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 597–
98 (2010) (discussing the erosion of tribal sovereignty).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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general population.83 Thus, while the following discussion describes
a broad expansion of tribal sovereign immunity, this expansion
takes place in the context of constriction of tribal sovereignty in
general.
B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Generally speaking, the immunity of a sovereign to suit is a
longstanding corollary to the sovereignty of any governmental
entity.84 Tribal sovereign immunity derives from tribal
sovereignty.85 Like state and federal sovereign immunity, tribal
immunity is an inherent power that prohibits state and private
suits against tribes, except in certain circumstances.86 Because
tribes are governments, it has long been understood that federally
recognized Indian tribes are subject to suit only when Congress
authorizes the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.87 Tribal
sovereign immunity was once thought to be confined to
governmental on-reservation activity and thus did not extend to offreservation conduct.88 However, after the Kiowa89 decision described
below, a federal common-law default rule of immunity for all tribal
83. Id. at 595.
84. See id. at 616–17 (discussing the origins of the sovereign immunity
doctrine).
85. COHEN, supra note 74, at 635.
86. Id. at 636. Tribal sovereign immunity does not bar suits by the federal
government, however. Id.
87. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).
88. See id. at 754–56 (noting that while the Court never drew a distinction,
other courts had limited off-reservation immunity).
89. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998)
(permitting tribal sovereign immunity to extend off-reservation). Kiowa involved
a Tribal Development Commission that agreed to purchase stock through a
promissory note in the name of the tribe. Id. at 751. Though the tribe argued the
deal was signed on tribal land, the Respondent maintained that the note was
executed and delivered in Oklahoma City, or non-tribal land. Id. The tribe
defaulted on the note and the Respondent sued for the breach of contract. Id.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Indian tribes are subject to suit in
state court for breaches of contract involving off-reservation commercial
conduct. Id. at 755. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court declined to draw a distinction based on where the tribal activity
occurred, granting sovereignty to tribal conduct for purely off-reservation
conduct. Id. at 760.
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activity, on- or off-reservation, was articulated by the U.S. Supreme
Court.90 By declining to draw a distinction between tribal activities
on or off reservation land, and choosing to defer to Congress, the
Court held that tribal sovereign immunity applies to virtually all
tribally-owned enterprises, whatever the industry and wherever
located.91 Thus, states may attempt to regulate off-reservation tribal
activities, but sovereign immunity prevents states from enforcing its
substantive laws against tribes through the courts.92

C. The History of Indian Sovereign Immunity: Does It Rest on
a “Slender Reed”?
Tribal immunity rests on a far more slender reed than
sovereignty itself. Tribes have had sovereignty over their members,
territory, and affairs from “time immemorial.”93 Congress has
limited this sovereignty, however, by placing tribes under the
legislative authority of the United States.94 Tribal sovereignty, then,
is subject to the will of Congress, which exercises plenary power
over Indian affairs.95
D. Pre-Kiowa Case Law
Although tribal sovereign immunity is now well established, the
U.S. Supreme Court claims that the doctrine developed “almost by
90. See id. at 764 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have treated the doctrine
of sovereign immunity from judicial jurisdiction as settled law, but in none of
our cases have we applied the doctrine to purely off-reservation conduct.”).
91. See id. at 760 (majority opinion) (“[W]e decline to revisit our case law
and choose to defer to Congress. Tribes enjoy immunity from suits on contracts,
whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and
whether they were made on or off a reservation.”).
92. See id. at 755 (“There is a difference between the right to demand
compliance with state laws and the means available to enforce them.”).
93. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 3 (1831).
94. See COHEN, supra note 74, at 221–24 (discussing federal statutory
limitations on tribal sovereignty).
95. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (“[A]lthough possessed of
these attributes of local self-government when exercising their tribal functions,
all such rights are subject to the supreme legislative authority of the United
States.”).
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accident.”96 The Court never mentioned the sovereign immunity of a
tribe until the 1919 case of Turner v. United States,97 in which it
mentioned the doctrine in dicta.98 Turner arose when members of
the Creek Tribe tore down a fence to Creek grazing lands leased to
Turner, and Turner sued the tribe for not preventing the
destruction.99 In Turner, the Court held that the obstacle to recovery
was “not the immunity of a sovereign to suit, but the lack of a
substantive right.”100 The case was decided not on the basis of the
sovereign immunity of the Creek Nation, but rather because the
failure of a government or its officers to keep the peace was not
actionable.101 Justice Kennedy, writing almost eighty years later,
called the Turner tribal sovereignty language a “slender reed” for
supporting today’s principle of tribal sovereign immunity.102
The hint articulated in Turner became recognized law twentyone years later in United States v. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. (U.S. F. & G.).103 In U.S. F. & G., the Court ruled on a
cross-claim filed for mining royalties against two tribal nations.104
Citing Turner, the Court held that tribes are “exempt from suit
without Congressional authorization,” that the immunity of the
tribes was inherently “theirs as sovereigns,” and that immunity for
tribes rested on the same public policy as federal sovereign
immunity.105 U.S. F. & G. stands for a generalized notion of tribal
sovereign immunity, retained since the pre-European era.
Since Turner in 1940, the concept of tribal sovereign immunity
has taken much fuller form. In fact, since the Santa Clara Pueblo106
decision in 1978, it has been clear that without an explicit
96. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 761 (1998).
97. Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
98. Florey, supra note 80, at 619.
99. Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 356–57 (1919). Turner also sued
the United States as trustee of Creek funds. Id. at 357.
100. Id. at 358.
101. Id.
102. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757 (1998).
103. See United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940)
(“These Indian Nations are exempt from suit without Congressional
authorization.”).
104. Id. at 510.
105. Id. at 512–13. The Court did not articulate the common public policy.
106. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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Congressional waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, a tribal
government can choose not to follow even federal law—at least
where the plaintiff is an individual citizen rather than the federal
government itself.107 In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the
Supreme Court interpreted the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), a
federal statute that extends portions of the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment to tribal people and lands.108 The Santa
Clara Pueblo had a policy of excluding from membership the
children of females who married outside the tribe, but including the
children of males, which potentially violated ICRA.109 However, in
the absence of “unequivocally expressed” Congressional intent that
a tribe is subject to a suit in federal court, the Court found that
sovereign immunity barred a suit against the tribe under ICRA.110
Thus, although the law was constructed by Congress to apply to
tribes, sovereign immunity was held to be sufficiently robust to
prevent federal enforcement of IRCA, at least when the suit was
brought by an individual plaintiff.111
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma,112 the Supreme Court held that
sovereign immunity extends to on-reservation commercial activity
conducted by a tribe.113 In Potawatomi, Oklahoma sought the
collection of the state tax on cigarettes by the Potawatomi tribal
convenience store.114 Although the Court held that the state of
Oklahoma had the authority to tax cigarette sales to non-tribal
members, it could not sue the tribe to collect the revenue.115 The
Court suggested alternative remedies, including collecting the sales
tax from wholesalers by off-reservation seizure of cigarettes or
107. See id. at 55–58 (discussing tribal sovereign immunity).
108. Id. at 62–72.
109. Id. at 51.
110. Id. at 58–59.
111. Id. at 71–72. Santa Clara was upsetting to some scholars and caused
consternation toward the Supreme Court at the time. At its essence, however,
the decision could hardly have gone any other way. Only a tribe, and certainly
not the federal government, can decide who in society is entitled to tribal
membership.
112. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla.,
498 U.S. 505 (1991).
113. Id. at 513.
114. Id. at 507–08.
115. Id. at 512.
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assessing suppliers, by agreement with the tribe, or through
lobbying Congress.116 In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens noted
that he was unsure that tribal sovereign immunity would extend to
the off-reservation commercial activity of a tribe.117 Five years later,
in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., the Court held
exactly that.
E. The Kiowa Holding
In Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., the Court
held that tribal sovereign immunity applies to off-reservation
commercial activity conducted by a tribe.118 In Kiowa, the tribe
defaulted on a note executed off-reservation to Manufacturing
Technologies, who sued the tribe for the balance owed.119 The Court
agreed with Manufacturing Technologies’ argument that state laws
can be applied to tribal activities outside of Indian country.120 But,
citing Potawatomi, the Court countered that “[t]here is a difference
between the right to demand compliance with state laws and the
means available to enforce them.”121 The Court refused to limit
tribal sovereign immunity to suits stemming from on-reservation
transactions, noting that precedent did not support a distinction
based on reservation boundaries.122 Nor was the Court willing to
draw a distinction between commercial and governmental activities
of a tribe.123 Rather, the Court held that an “Indian tribe is subject
to suit only where Congress has expressly authorized the suit or the
tribe has waived immunity,”124 and that tribal sovereign immunity
“is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the
States.”125

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 514.
Id. at 515 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).
Id. at 751.
Id. at 755.
Id.
Id. at 754–55.
Id.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 756.
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The Court in Kiowa articulated a clear and robust doctrine of
tribal sovereign immunity but showed some reluctance to do so,
stating that there were reasons “to doubt the wisdom of
perpetuating the doctrine.”126 Given the interdependent and mobile
American society of the late twentieth century, and the broad
participation of tribes in the wider economy, noted the Court, tribal
sovereign immunity “can harm those who are unaware that they are
dealing with a tribe who do not know of tribal immunity or who
have no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort victims.”127 The
Court stated that the rationale for a broad tribal immunity—the
safeguarding of tribal self-governance and promotion of economic
development and self-sufficiency—could be “challenged as
inapposite to modern, wide-ranging tribal enterprises extending
well beyond traditional tribal customs and activities.”128 Although
tribal sovereign immunity was a judicially created doctrine, and
despite the Court’s reservations about the doctrine’s reach, the
Court in Kiowa candidly chose to defer to Congress.129 In so doing,
the Court invited Congress to reconsider the wisdom of recognizing
sovereign immunity.130
F. Kiowa’s Progeny
Nearly one-hundred years since the first passing mention of
tribal sovereign immunity, it is clear from Kiowa that any tribal
enterprise not subject to a specific waiver of immunity by Congress
or the tribe is immune from suit on the basis of tribal sovereign
immunity.131 Kiowa’s progeny is extensive.132 One 2008 study of
126. Id. at 758. Note the Court’s retention of the doctrine in Potawatomi “on
the theory that Congress had failed to abrogate it in order to promote economic
development and tribal self-sufficiency.” Id. at 757.
127. Id. at 758.
128. Id. at 757–58.
129. Id. at 758–60. The Court noted that Congress was “in a position to
weigh and accommodate the competing policy concerns and reliance interests,”
and that Congress has authorized suit against tribes in the past, but had not
done so in this area. Id. at 759.
130. Id. at 758.
131. Id. at 760.
132. See Jeff M. Kosseff, Note, Sovereignty for Profits: Courts’ Expansion of
Sovereign Immunity to Tribe-Owned Businesses, 5 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 131,
138–39 (2009) (discussing the multitude of lower court cases that have followed
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Kiowa’s effects on reported decisions found seventy-one opinions
citing Kiowa as a primary reason to extend sovereign immunity to a
tribally-owned commercial entity.133 Forty-six of these were casinorelated cases, seventeen involved breach of contract claims filed by
companies that did business with a tribe, twenty-six involved
employment-related suits, and twenty-one were personal injury
claims.134 Thirty-nine of the seventy-one opinions were federal and
twenty-one were state court opinions.135

V. Confused Courts: Is the Arm of the Tribe a Misplaced
Appendage?
Now that tribal sovereignty extends to commercial enterprises
and off-reservation conduct, the question becomes, What constitutes
a tribal enterprise? If anything remotely connected to a tribe will
qualify, Congress may well move to abrogate immunity in the face of
a power that can be easily abused. This seems particularly likely in
cases where the entities gaining the financial benefits from
immunity are not tribes, but outside, non-tribal interests for whom
there may be no policy justification for immunity. Since Kiowa, the
Supreme Court has yet to address what constitutes a tribal
enterprise directly, though it did recognize in a footnote that a
corporation can be an “arm of the tribe” for sovereign immunity
purposes.136 Using this passing phrase as a starting point, courts
now attempt to determine if a corporate entity is an arm of the tribe
through various multi-factor tests.137
Kiowa).
133. Id. at 138.
134. See id. (“Immunity [has been provided] to a wide variety of tribal
entities, including tobacco companies, snow removal contractors, truck stops,
hotels, and payday loan companies.”).
135. Id.
136. Inyo Cnty. v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the
Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701, 705 n.1 (2003).
137. See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046–47 (9th Cir.
2006) (examining whether a casino was operated as an “arm of the tribe”). For
earlier uses of the test, see Redding Rancheria v. Super. Ct., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d
773, 776–77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that factors to determine if an entity is
entitled to immunity include the importance of gaming in promoting tribal selfdetermination, the close link between the tribe and the casino, and the existence
of federal law promoting Indian gambling). As established in Kiowa, the
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A. Arm of the Tribe Outside Payday Lending
Courts have articulated numerous variations on the test for
whether a tribal business enterprise is entitled to the tribe’s
immunity. Common factors used by courts in the arm-of-the-tribe
analysis include:
(1) whether the enterprise performs a commercial (i.e.,
proprietary) or traditional governmental function; (2) whether it
is for-profit or nonprofit and generates its own revenue; (3) the
enterprise’s financial relationship with the tribe, including where
the enterprise’s revenues go and how they are used; (4) whether a
suit against the enterprise will jeopardize tribal assets;
(5) whether the enterprise has insurance to protect the tribal
fiscal resources; and (6) who controls the enterprise’s activities.138

Immunity clearly extends to tribally-owned health
organizations, housing authorities, museums, and casinos.139 As the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Allen v. Gold Casino, the
casino’s creation in that case was “dependent upon government
approval at numerous levels, in order for it to conduct gaming
activities permitted only under the auspices of the Tribe.”140
However, casinos are somewhat unique in the world of tribal
economic development, as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
explicitly provides for the creation and operation of Indian casinos,
in order to promote “tribal economic development, self-sufficiency,
and strong tribal governments.”141 While the U.S. Supreme Court
has set out the name of the relevant test, i.e., the arm-of-the-tribe
standard, it is still unclear what constitutes an arm of the tribe.

question is not whether the activity may be characterized as a business, which
is irrelevant, but whether the entity acts as an arm of the tribe so that its
activities are properly deemed to be those of the tribe. Gold Country Casino, 464
F.3d at 1046.
138. Patrice H. Kunesh, Tribal Self-Determination in the Age of Scarcity, 54
S.D. L. REV. 398, 399 (2009) (citations omitted).
139. Id. at 402. For a collection of cases and their conclusions regarding
various entities, see id. at 402–03 nn.29, 31.
140. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d at 1046.
141. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1)).
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B. The Application of Kiowa to Payday Lending: “[W]e are in a
Gray Zone.”142
It is presumptively true from Kiowa’s holding that an internetbased payday lender that is formed, funded, and run by a tribe for
the benefit of the tribe is entitled to tribal sovereign immunity.143 If
that scenario exists at all, however, it is rare. Typically, a non-tribal
payday lender makes an arrangement with a tribe under which the
tribe receives a percentage of the profits, or simply a monthly fee, so
that otherwise forbidden practices of the lender are presumably
shielded by tribal immunity.144 This is described in the payday
lending industry as the “sovereign model.”145 Although there is little
sunlight on the true financial arrangements between the tribes and
payday lenders, under one such agreement, between one and two
percent of the payday profits of one “tribal” lender actually went to
the tribes.146 By contrast, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,147
which extensively regulates the Indian gaming industry for the
benefit of tribes, mandates that at least 60% of the profits from each
gaming enterprise go directly go to the tribe under normal
circumstances,148 with a maximum of 30% going to non-tribal
consultants and mangers.149
142. Petition for Review and Stay at 17, MTE Fin. Servs., Inc., v. Alameda
County Super. Ct., No. S194110 (Cal. June 20, 2011), 2011 WL 2707079, at *17
(quoting the trial judge from trial transcript).
143. See supra notes 118–30 and accompanying text (discussing the holding
of Kiowa).
144. See The Connection Between Indian Tribes and Payday Lending, supra
note 72 (briefly describing the partnership between tribes and payday lenders).
145. See C4T, Huge Victory for the Sovereign Model, Feb. 12, 2012,
http://www.consultants4tribes.com/category/sovereign-model (last visited Mar.
2, 2012) (collecting this and other blog posts related to the sovereign model) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY BLOG,
http://paydayloanindustryblog.com/Payday%20loan%20industry/sovereign-nationmodel/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2012) (collecting blog posts related to the sovereign
model) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
146. Real Parties in Interest’s Answer to MTE Financial Services, Inc.’s
Petition for Review and Request for Stay at 4, No. S194110 (Cal. June 23, 2011),
2011 WL 2907024, at *4 (“Verified discovery responses in this case supplied by
another defendant, Processing Solutions, LLC, states that MTE received
between 1% and 2% of the total loan revenue.”).
147. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701–2721 (2012).
148. Id. § 2710(b)(4).
149. Id. § 2711(7).
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As the last section articulates, in the absence of guidance from
Congress or binding precedent,150 state and federal courts are
developing arm-of-the-tribe tests piecemeal.151 For example, a recent
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals case also sets out a multi-factor
test.152 This inconsistency and lack of authority has led to expensive,
inefficient litigation. Although it is unclear whether and under what
circumstances the typical tribally-affiliated payday lender will meet
these tests, tribes and their affiliated lenders have yet to experience
a significant setback at trial. Below we examine three recent cases
from state courts. As would be expected after the Supreme Court’s
holding in Kiowa, policy arguments resting on the harm done to a
vulnerable population by tribally-affiliated payday lenders whose
practices violate state regulations have not succeeded in court. In
Ameriloan v. Superior Court,153 the court acknowledged but then
rejected the California Department of Corporations’ equitable
arguments against applying sovereign immunity in the context of
payday lending.154 There, the California Court of Appeals held that
sovereign immunity is not a discretionary doctrine.155 It is
independent of the equities of a given situation.156 Rather, this is a
“pure jurisdictional question.”157
The court stated, however, that it was within the realm of the
imagination that a tribal entity could engage in activities that were
150. Kiowa clarified that sovereign immunity applies to off-reservation
tribal commercial enterprises, but involved a suit against the tribe itself, and
did not outline a test to determine when a tribally created entity qualifies as an
arm of the tribe.
151. See supra Part V.A.
152. Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort,
629 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2010). In this case, the Court applied a test that
included these factors for determining whether a tribal economic entity qualifies
as “subordinate to the tribe,” so as to share in the tribe’s sovereign immunity:
(1) the method of creation of the entity; (2) its purpose; (3) its structure,
ownership, and management, including the amount of control the tribe exercises
over the entity; (4) the tribe’s intent with respect to the sharing of the soverign
immunity; (5) the financial relationship between the tribe and the entity; and
(6) whether the purposes of tribal sovereign immunity are served by granting
the entity immunity. Id.
153. Ameriloan v. Super. Ct., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
154. Id. at 581–82.
155. Id. at 582.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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so distant from tribal interests that the entity could no longer be
legitimately seen as an extension of the tribe and would therefore
fail the arm-of-the-tribe test and not be entitled to immunity.158
Tribally chartered corporations that are “completely independent of
the tribe,” noted the court, are not covered by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.159 Ameriloan also left open the possibility that
a distinction in sovereign immunity might be drawn between Indian
gaming entities and payday loan companies, on the basis that the
Indian gaming industry has been recognized by Congress as
important to the welfare of Indian tribes, while payday lending has
not.160
Rather than rule against the lender, the court in Ameriloan
remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether
payday lending entities are sufficiently related to the tribe to benefit
from sovereign immunity.161 In order to analyze whether payday
lending entities are in fact arms of the tribe, the Ameriloan court
instructed the lower court to consider two factors: (1) “whether the
tribe and the entities are closely linked in governing structure and
characteristics” and (2) “whether federal policies intended to
promote Indian tribal autonomy are furthered by extension of
immunity to the business entity.”162 The Ameriloan court authorized
limited discovery, “directed solely to matters affecting the trial
court’s subject matter jurisdiction,”163 meaning discovery tailored to
the two broad factors mentioned above.
Cash Advance and Preferred Cash Loans v. State,164 a Colorado
Supreme Court case, upheld the Colorado Court of Appeals decision
that sovereign immunity from suit shielded two tribally affiliated
internet payday lenders when they operated as arms of the tribe,
158. Id. at 585 (quoting Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino, 84 Cal. Rptr.
2d. 65, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)).
159. Id. (quoting Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Super. Ct., 52
Cal. Rptr. 3d 659, 665 (Cal. 2006)).
160. Id. at 586 n.10.
161. Id. at 585.
162. Id. at 586 (citing Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046
(9th Cir. 2006); Redding Rancheria v. Super. Ct., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773, 776
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 65,
68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)).
163. Id.
164. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. State, 242 P.3d 1099 (Colo.
2010) (en banc).
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but it significantly altered the lower court’s arm-of-the-tribe test.165
The lenders, affiliated with the Miami Nation and the Santee Sioux
Nation, were targeted by the Colorado Attorney General for
allegedly violating the state’s payday lending laws.166 The Court of
Appeals reviewed five different arm-of-the-tribe tests from other
jurisdictions,167 focusing on an eleven-factor test culled from the
dissent of a Washington Supreme Court case.168 The Colorado
Supreme Court, citing Kiowa, rejected the eleven-factor test, stating
that at least two of the factors considered “the entity’s purpose [and]
would function as a state-imposed limitation on tribal sovereign
immunity, in contravention of [Kiowa].”169
The Colorado Supreme Court replaced the eleven-part test with
a three-factor test that “focuses on the relationship between the
tribal entities and the tribes: . . . (1) whether the tribes created the
entities pursuant to tribal law; (2) whether the tribes own and
operate the entities; and (3) whether the entities’ immunity protects
the tribes’ sovereignty.”170 Contrary to the Court of Appeals, which
factored in the purpose of the entity, the Colorado Supreme Court
explicitly grounded its approach in the inherent nature of tribal
sovereignty.171 Cash Advance also clarified that the burden of proof
rests not with the tribe, but rather with the state, which must prove
that sovereign immunity does not apply.172
165. See id. at 1110 (adopting three factors from the federal courts of appeal
and noting that the Colorado Court of Appeal’s eleven factor test was “contrary
to federal in some respects”).
166. Id. at 1103.
167. State ex rel. Suthers v. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans, 205
P.3d 389, 403–05 (Colo. App. 2008).
168. Id. at 405–06. The Washington Supreme Court case from which the
eleven-factor test was taken by the lower court is Wright v. Colville Tribal
Enterprise Corp., 147 P.3d 1275 (Wash. 2006).
169. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans, 242 P.3d at 1111. The two
factors that were explicitly rejected were: “(2) whether the purposes of Cash
Advance and Preferred Cash are similar to the Tribes’ purposes;” and “(9) the
announced purposes of Cash Advance and Preferred Cash.” Id. at1105. Another
notable factor that was jettisoned was “(10) whether Cash Advance and
Preferred Cash manage or exploit tribal resources.” Id.
170. Id. at 1110.
171. See id. at 1110 n.11. (“We prefer an approach that recognizes, without
diminishing, the inherent nature of tribal sovereignty.”).
172. Id. at 1113. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that sovereign
immunity is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction rather than an affirmative
defense, and thus that, as a result, the state must prove by a preponderance of
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The Colorado Supreme Court remanded to the state trial court,
which held that the lending entities were, in fact, arms of the tribe
and thus entitled to sovereign immunity.173 The court noted that a
tribal entity does not lose its immunity simply by contracting with
non-Indian operators of the business.174 It found that the
Congressional intent of promoting tribal economic development was
furthered by allowing Indian Nations the freedom “to enter into
commercial areas where they have no expertise, but can acquire the
necessary expertise through non-Indian operators.”175
The court held that the inquiry into tribal immunity is focused
on the status of the entities in the present.176 In other words,
whether a particular entity meets the arm-of-the-tribe test is
answered with the facts as they are when the court considers the
matter, not when the complaint was filed or any other time in the
past.177
The court found that the three factors of the arm-of-the-tribe
test were met with regard to the two tribal entities at issue. It found
that the entities in question, Miami Nations Enterprises, Inc.
(MNE) and SFS, Inc. (SFS)178 were formed pursuant to tribal law as
evidenced by documents put before the court.179 The court further
held that the businesses were owned and operated by the tribes,180
and were thus in such relation to the tribe that granting immunity
would protect the sovereignty of the tribe.181
evidence that the tribes are not entitled to sovereign immunity. Id.
173. Amended Order, State of Colorado v. Cash Advance, Case No.
05CV1143, on remand, Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. State, 242
P.3d 1099 (Colo. 2010) (en banc) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
174. Id. at 11.
175. Id. (citing Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Riverside Cnty., 783
F.2d 900, 901 (9th Cir. 1986), aff’d sub. nom. California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (noting with approval that the tribal
business was “operated by non-Indian professional operators, who receive a
percentage of the profits”).
176. Id. at 12. The court uses the phrase “trapped in the present.” Id.
177. Id.
178. Doing business as, respectively, “Cash Advance” and “Preferred Cash
Loans.” Id. at 5.
179. Id. at 13–14.
180. Id. at 15. Documents placed before the court indicated that the tribe
chooses MNE’s board of directors, that two of the three directors must be
members, and that the Business Committee hired the CEO. Id.
181. Id at 16. Here, the court points to economic benefits to the tribe from

782

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751 (2012)

The court looked in detail at Colorado’s assertion that the tribal
entities were shams.182 It accepted the following as proven: that the
payday loan businesses existed before the tribal entities took them
over; that Scott Tucker, an experienced outside payday lender,
owned and operated those prior businesses; that Tucker’s loan
entities formerly did business under the current names of the
entities; that the tribes were likely recruited in the mistaken belief
that the businesses could be shielded by the sovereign immunity of
the tribes; and that during the initial period of affiliation, Tucker
was the true owner of the business.183 Nevertheless, because both
tribes replaced Tucker’s entities with wholly-owned tribal
corporations in 2008, the tribes were found to be the true owners at
the time of the court’s consideration, and thus immune.184
In dicta, the court speculated that even if it were true that
Tucker “functionally” owned the business in the present, it is still
“not at all certain the tribal entities would thereby lose their
immunity.”185 It is the tribal entity that is immune, “not their
particular businesses, and . . . tribal immunity does not depend in
any fashion on the type of business a tribal entity engages in, with
whom, or for what ulterior purpose.”186 However, the court noted
that it is only the tribal entities and their officers while acting
within the scope of tribal business that are immune from suit.187
Thus, Colorado could subpoena Tucker and his non-tribal officers as
well as non-tribal entities to discover whether they were and still
are the lenders.188 The court found that the state could not subpoena
the businesses.
182. Id. at 18–23.
183. Id. at 20–21 (noting that ownership could be inferred from the fact that
Mr. Tucker put up all of the capital for the businesses, providing $3 million to
one entity and $5 million to another). Both agreements called for 1% of the gross
to go to the tribes, with a monthly minimum of $20,000. It should be noted that
Judge Hoffman originally issued an order based on a misunderstanding that the
tribes received 99% of the profits from Tucker. Judge Hoffman acknowledged
the error in his amended order. He noted that the State’s sham argument was
“closer as a factual matter” under the actual arrangements, but remained
unproven. Further, the court said that “even if they were [sham owners,] that
characterization would not displace tribal immunity.” Id. at 1–2 n.1.
184. Id. at 21.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id at 22.
188. Id.
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the tribal entities. Colorado cannot do that, said the court, “any
more than it could subpoena France if it thought Tucker was the
real owner and operator of Air France.”189
Moreover, when the burden of proof rests on the party
challenging the immunity of a tribally-affiliated payday lender, the
specific details of what constitutes allowable discovery become
extraordinarily important. In Specially Appearing Defendant MTE
Financial Services, Inc. v. Alameda County Superior Court, briefed
in June 2011, tribally-affiliated lender MTE challenged the scope of
discovery allowed by the trial court.190 MTE and payday loan
borrowers Baillie and Rosas (Baillie) agreed that discovery was
appropriate on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction191 but
disagreed on what such discovery would entail.192 More precisely,
they disagreed about whether discovery should allow Baillie to
“follow the money trail.”193 Baillie asserted that a “thorough
explanation” of all the entities involved in the operation of the
payday entities, and the relationships between these entities, is
critical to the arm-of-the-tribe inquiry.194 To Baillie, the fact that the
tribe might receive just 1% to 2% of the monies generated by the
business implied that the tribe was merely rented.195 If so, argued
Baillie, the lending entity could not possibly meet the arm-of-thetribe test.196
Conversely, the lenders argued that allowing Baillie to “follow
the money” would constitute unjustifiable intrusive discovery and
189. Id.
190. See Petition for Review and Stay at 5, MTE Fin. Servs., Inc., v. Super.
Ct., No. S194110 (Cal. June 20, 2011), 2011 WL 2707079, at *5 (seeking review
“to settle an important question related to whether Indian tribal sovereign
immunity is dependent upon the type of ‘tribal business venture’”).
191. Ameriloan is binding precedent on this point. See supra notes 154–64
and accompanying text (discussing the Ameriloan holding).
192. See Real Parties in Interest’s Answer to MTE Financial Services, Inc.’s
Petition for Review and Request for Stay, supra note 146, at *3–4.
193. Compare id. at *4 (arguing that arm-of-the-tribe analysis necessitates
an investigation of the money trail in this case), with Petition for Review and
Stay, supra note 190, at 18 (arguing against the trial court’s order allowing
Plaintiffs to “follow the money”).
194. Real Parties in Interest’s Answer to MTE Financial Services, Inc.’s
Petition for Review and Request for Stay, supra note 192, at *4.
195. Id. at *12.
196. Id. at *12–13.
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would pry into the internal affairs of the tribe.197 The tribe willingly
provided MTE’s organizational documents and documents
indicating that MTE is a chartered corporation organized under the
laws of the Modoc Tribe of Oklahoma by Tribal Resolution, wholly
owned by the Modoc Tribe, to facilitate goals relating to the
economy, government, and sovereignty of the tribe.198 The articles of
incorporation expressly provide for MTE to share in the sovereign
immunity of the tribe.199
The briefs in MTE illustrate the two poles of the arm-of-thetribe debate as it relates to tribally-affiliated lenders. Tribes will
likely maintain that whether an entity functions as an arm of the
tribe is a foundational inquiry, and not to be inferred from the
functional arrangements, whatever they are. If tribal sovereignty is
inherent and not subject to diminution by the states, so the
argument goes, a state court lacks the power to hold that a tribal
entity formed according to tribal law, by tribal resolution, for the
stated purposes of tribal development, with clear intent on the part
of the sovereign tribe to convey its sovereign immunity to the entity,
is not an arm of the tribe, simply because the deal the tribe
negotiated does not retain enough of the profits to satisfy the court.
On the other hand, it is common sense that if an entity provides a
miniscule percentage of its revenue to the tribe, and the tribe is
barely involved, the entity cannot be said to stand in the place of the
tribe. Moreover, if a tribe retains only a minimal percentage of the
profits from the enterprise, it would appear that the enterprise may
not be truly “controlled” by the tribe.
C. If Today’s Lenders Are Not Tribes, What About Tomorrow’s?
We suspect that many of the current connections between tribes
and internet payday lenders are tenuous, and further, that tribes
generally receive minimal compensation relative to their non-tribal
partners. It is unclear whether these payday lending operations are
managed by tribes in any substantial sense. In some cases we know
that lenders claim to be tribally-owned when in reality, there is no
197.
198.
199.

Petition for Review and Stay, supra note 190, at *18.
Id. at *4–5.
Id. at *9.
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connection to a tribe.200 Obviously, tribal sovereign immunity is not
implicated at all in such cases. Moreover, the most recent arm-ofthe-tribe test from a payday case201—a permissive formulation
relative to past tests—requires that the enterprise be owned and
operated by the tribe. Thus, any payday lending entity that entails
strictly passive involvement on the part of the tribe would fail this
test.
It is less clear how future internet payday lenders will be
operated, as tribes may themselves begin to operate these lenders
and thus fulfill the arm-of-the-tribe test. Ironically, the more tightly
states regulate the payday industry, the more valuable tribal
sovereign immunity becomes, and the more likely that tribes will
take control of these operations, retaining more of the profits. In
other words, more tribes could choose to simply form, fund, and run
operations of their own, solely for the benefit of their members, thus
meeting Kiowa directly. Since even the most improbably one-sided
state court rulings from the perspective of consumer protection are
unlikely to provide a stable solution to this problem, we turn below
to other potential resolutions.
VI. Potential Solutions to the Problem
Although access to emergency cash for people in need is
arguably beneficial, the record on unregulated payday lending
indicates that the business model is frequently exploitative of a
vulnerable and often poor population. Yet many, if not most, tribes
are still in need of fundamental economic development to provide
basic social services to their members. Tribal options are often
limited by circumstances thrust upon tribes by history. For some
200. See WESTERN SKY FINANCIAL, http://www.westernsky.com (last visited
Jan. 12, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Western Sky Financial is owned wholly by an individual Tribal
Member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and is not owned or
operated by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe or any of its political
subdivisions. WESTERN SKY FINANCIAL is a Native American
business operating within the exterior boundaries of the Cheyenne
River Sioux Reservation, a sovereign nation located within the United
States of America.
201. See supra notes 154–64 and accompanying text (discussing Ameriloan
v. Super. Ct., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)).
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tribes, payday lending may be an important means of generating
income and opportunity. The tribal sovereignty model that allows
payday lenders to operate without regard to state lending
regulations is most pernicious when tribes do not get the lion’s share
of the profits. Since this seems to be the typical case, we view the
tribal sovereignty model (as it is currently put into practice) more as
a problem for vulnerable consumers than as a potential solution to
tribal disadvantage.
Nevertheless, unless states can prove that an entity is not
operated and controlled by a tribe, state and circuit courts will lack
the power to significantly limit use of the tribal sovereign immunity
avenue.202 Below we explore several other potential solutions to the
tribal sovereignty model: (1) decisions by tribes themselves to
regulate or prohibit payday lending; (2) Supreme Court doctrinal
revision or clarification; (3) congressional action; and (4) agency
action by either the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau or the
Federal Trade Commission.
A. Tribal Regulation or Restraint: Tribes May Choose to Regulate
Payday Lending or Refrain from Unregulated Payday Lending.
Tribes can decide for themselves how to address payday
lending. The decision by a tribe to participate in unregulated payday
lending, regulate payday lending, or simply forbid payday lending
by its members and corporations, is a contextualized inquiry that
each tribe must make independently. This decision will depend
upon each tribe’s unique culture, laws, tradition, customs, beliefs,
and economic circumstances. However, there are important reasons
why a tribe might choose to refrain from engaging in unregulated
payday lending, especially when a substantial portion of the
economic benefit is to be siphoned off by outsiders. Tribes can look to
state payday lending laws for examples of effective regulation, or
fashion their own forms of regulation. Tribes may wish to form
coalitions with other tribes in order to strategize about effective laws
and policies.

202. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing the notion that
tribal immunity is a question of jurisdiction and noting the burden of proof rests
on the party challenging immunity).
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Conversely, a tribe that engages in unregulated payday lending
stakes out a de facto position that it opposes regulation designed to
protect vulnerable consumers. Because the lending entity stands in
the place of the tribe,203 it is as if the tribe itself is engaging in the
exploitation of the underprivileged for the sake of profit. Such action
could tarnish sovereignty. Exploitative payday lending can do
significant harm to an already vulnerable person or family, and thus
there is an ethical dimension to tribal participation. As scholar Sam
Deloria aptly notes, “sovereignty can be used in a way that erodes
itself.”204
Use of tribal sovereign immunity to engage in unregulated
payday lending in contravention of state law might engender a
backlash, such as that experienced by tribes in 1976–1977, in
response to non-Indian views that tribes were favored by the federal
government.205 As Deloria further concludes, in the context of statetribal collaboration:
[R]ecent history shows that the diminutions of tribal sovereignty
have come from the courts’ responses to tribal unilateral
assertions of sovereignty or from efforts by individuals to avoid
sovereignty, in lawsuits that might well have not been brought if
the situations had been addressed—and managed—by an
intergovernmental agreement.206

Tribal sovereign immunity, although not conferred, is not
absolute. Use of sovereign immunity to evade consumer protection
laws may be exactly the type of activity referred to in Kiowa as
having the potential to undermine the congressional rationale for a
robust sovereign immunity doctrine presumed by the Supreme
Court.207 Although the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity (as
203. See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006)
(explaining that when an entity acts as an arm of the tribe, its “activities are
properly deemed to be those of the tribe,” and providing examples of entities
found to be acting as an arm of the tribe).
204. Sam Deloria, Tassie Hanna & Chuck Trimble, The Commission on
State-Tribal Relations: Enduring Lessons in the Modern State-Tribal
Relationship 38 (August 2, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
205. Id. at 18–19.
206. Id. at 38.
207. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757–58 (1998). The
fact that this might be seen as undermining the presumed congressional
rationale is not an argument for a court’s allowing suit against a tribal entity

788

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751 (2012)

opposed to sovereignty generally) has thus far expanded
consistently, the doctrine of tribal territorial sovereignty has, in the
past, seen a retreat after an expansionary period.208 The use of
tribal sovereign immunity to escape state regulation as the value in
a business partnership might attract the attention of Congress or
the Supreme Court. Once the issue is taken up, congressional
intervention or binding federal precedent might not be narrowly
tailored, and tribal sovereign immunity could be hampered beyond
payday lending. Although tribes make independent decisions with
regard to the exercise of sovereign immunity, the negative
consequences of a Supreme Court ruling or congressional
intervention in this area would affect them all.
Because of harmful and steady constriction in other realms of
tribal sovereignty, restriction in the area of tribal sovereign
immunity has the potential to significantly diminish the ability of
tribes to make and be controlled by their own laws.209 We do not
question the right of tribes to utilize sovereign immunity to engage
in payday lending. Rather, we gently question the wisdom. Although
unregulated payday lending might be profitable, and a sovereign’s
responsibility to its people is unquestionably paramount, both
ethical and practical considerations could cause tribes to
autonomously reject this opportunity. Because the actions of any
single tribe could have ramifications for all others, collective action
on the part of tribes, if possible, may be important. Thus, tribes may
want to form coalitions and otherwise organize with other tribes in
order to address payday lending.
B. The Supreme Court Could Clarify or Revise Tribal Sovereign
Immunity

engaged in payday lending. The statement in Kiowa was dicta, but the holding
is firm: a tribal entity—commercial or not, and regardless of whether the
activity takes place outside of the reservation—shares in the tribe’s sovereign
immunity. Id. at 760. The analysis focuses on the relationship between the tribe
and the entity, and cannot judge the type of activity in which the entity is
engaged.
208. Deloria et al., supra note 204, at 15–20; Florey, supra note 80, at 603–
13.
209. See Florey, supra note 80, at 640 (explaining that tribal immunity is
one of the few robust protections remaining for tribal sovereignty).
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The Supreme Court could clarify the arm-of-the-tribe test, or
otherwise modify or even eliminate tribal sovereign immunity.
While the Supreme Court already had an opportunity to clarify the
arm-of-the-tribe test in Kiowa, and while the unambiguous holding
in Kiowa allows little room for modification by the Court without
overturning established precedent, the Court can still overrule
Kiowa now, particularly in the face of abuses of power. Doing so
would fly in the face of the Supreme Court’s expressed deference to
Congress in this area, but this does not mean that it will not be
done.
Commentators have suggested that the Court shows “no
inclination to step in” and limit tribal sovereign immunity,210 yet
recent cases cast doubt on whether the Court truly intends to
remain uninvolved, deferring indefinitely to Congress. In Madison
County, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York,211 the
Court granted certiorari on the question of “whether tribal sovereign
immunity from suit, to the extent it should continue to be
recognized, bars taxing authorities from foreclosing.”212 Currently
before the Court is a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari begging
specifically that the Supreme Court abrogate the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity altogether.213 These cases show that although
the law might seem well settled by Kiowa, each time the issue of
tribal sovereignty is raised in the courts, the risk of radical change is
presented. Payday lending cases fit squarely into the reasons the
Kiowa dissent and the majority dicta expressed reservations with
the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine as a whole.214 Thus, tribally210. See id. at 625 (recounting that Congress declined to restrict sovereign
immunity, and that the Supreme Court has also not made any efforts to do so);
see also Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign
Immunity Under Federal Law, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 665–666 (2002) (discussing
the development of federal policy with respect to tribal immunity and the
Court’s deference to the legislative and executive branches in this policy area).
211. See Madison Cnty., New York v. Oneida Indian Nation, 131 S. Ct. 704,
704 (2011) (remanding to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit the
question of whether the Oneida nation had waived its sovereign immunity).
212. Id. at 704.
213. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Reed v. Gutierrez, (No. 10-1390),
2011 WL 1821576 (2011), available at http://www.narf.org/sct/reedvgutierrez/
petition_for_cert.pdf.
214. See supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text. The dissent points out
that tribal sovereign immunity doctrine is “unjust” as applied to off-reservation
commercial conduct and that sovereigns should “be held accountable for their
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affiliated payday lending presents increased risk to all tribes who
depend on tribal sovereign immunity as a tool for economic
development and a buttress to tribal sovereignty.
C. Congressional Action
At the time of the decision in Kiowa, Congress was actively
debating legislation that would have imposed very general
limitations on tribal sovereign immunity.215 It would not be
unprecedented for Congress to reconsider and reconstruct the
contours of tribal sovereign immunity in general. Payday lending,
and the “tribal sovereignty” model in particular, have recently
attracted negative attention216—attention that could inspire
Congress to revisit the issue of tribal sovereign immunity.
Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs,217 and
therefore congressional action would be the most definitive of the
potential solutions to the loophole. Unless held unconstitutional,
any congressional action would be binding and definitive unless
superseded by subsequent legislation. Congressional action has the
benefit of providing certainty and could stem the growth of wasteful
lawsuits in this area. Congressional intervention would bring
considerable risk to tribal interests that tribal sovereign immunity
would be impacted well beyond the specific issue of internet payday
lending.
Congressional action would likely be welcomed by a potentially
powerful, if highly unusual, coalition of consumer protection
advocates, brick-and-mortar payday lenders,218 states’ rights
unlawful, injurious conduct.” Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 765–66.
215. Seielstad, supra note 210, at 711.
216. See, e.g., CBS Evening News: How “Payday” Lenders Pull Off Crippling
Rates (CBS television broadcast Sept. 26, 2011), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/09/26/eveningnews/main20111913.shtml.
217. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 44 (1831).
218. Brick and mortar payday lenders, who, as a whole, tenaciously fought
regulation, now view tribally-affiliated lenders who are able to avoid regulation
as a significant threat. Cf. Wayne Greene, Regulators in Dispute Over Internet
Payday Loans by Tribes, TULSA WORLD (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.tulsa
world.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=336&articleid=20111025_16_A1_Intern4
72461&r=2667 (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (explaining the difficulties of
regulating tribal lenders and the impact of tribal businesses on non-tribal
lenders) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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advocates, and those who take a narrow view of Native American
rights. Some commentators note that when Congress took up the
issue of tribal immunity around the time of the Kiowa decision, the
contemplated action would have “effectively eliminate[d] tribal
sovereign immunity.”219
Given the potentially broad base of support for the limitation of
tribal sovereign immunity, and the type of drastic action once
contemplated by Congress, it is very possible that congressional
action would carve into tribal immunity more generally than would
be required in order to simply regulate payday lending.
Congressional action could clearly establish the contours of the
tribal sovereignty model, or eliminate it entirely. If Congress acted
more broadly, it could significantly damage tribal autonomy.
Hopefully, if Congress does decide to regulate internet payday
lending, and other products such as similarly-priced internet
installment loans, Congress will do so narrowly, without abrogating
more tribal immunity than necessary.

D. Agency Action
1. The Federal Trade Commission Could Act
The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Bureau of Consumer
Protection, one of several Bureaus within the FTC, enforces federal
laws related to consumer affairs and rules promulgated by the
FTC.220 Its functions include investigations, enforcement actions,
and consumer and business education.221 Some of the issues that
have caught the FTC’s attention include telemarketing fraud, shady
practices by nursing homes, and identity theft.222 The FTC also
219. Seielstad, supra note 210, at 711.
220. See Federal Trade Commission, About the Bureau of Consumer
Protection (Jun. 16, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/about.shtm (last visited Feb. 5,
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, About the Bureau of Consumer
Protection, Division of Marketing Practices (Oct. 23, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/
bcp/bcpmp.shtm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (explaining enforcement efforts
against telemarketing fraud) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Federal Trade Commission, About the Bureau of Consumer Protection,
Division of Privacy and Identity Protection (Oct. 23, 2007), http://www.ftc.
gov/bcp/bcppip.shtm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (outlining some of the

792

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751 (2012)

oversees online advertising, behavioral targeting, and all issues
dealing with online privacy concerns.223
The FTC lacks authority over banks but does have authority
over payday lenders.224 While accused at times of being toothless or
doing too little on behalf of consumers generally, recent payday
lending practices have caught the commissioners’ attention.225 The
FTC recently sued several lenders, doing business as Lakota Cash
and Big Sky Cash, who allegedly send documents to their borrowers’
employers that mimic a garnishment by the federal government.226
Federal agencies can garnish without a court order.227
The FTC has not addressed the fundamental practices of
payday lending, however, such as charging triple-digit interest rates
Commission’s approach to combating identity theft) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Federal Trade Commission, About the
Bureau of Consumer Protection, Who Cares: Sources of Information About
Healthcare Products and Services, Assisted Living and Nursing Homes,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/whocares/nursinghomes.shtm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2012) (offering resources to assess services provided by nursing homes)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
223. Areas of principal concern for the FTC are: advertising and marketing,
financial products and practices, telemarketing fraud, privacy and identity
protection. See, e.g., supra note 221 and accompanying text; see also Michael D.
Scott, The FTC, The Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation:
Has the Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 133 (2008).
224. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41–58 (2012).
225. See FTC Action Halts Allegedly Illegal Tactics of Payday Lending
Operation That Attempted to Garnish Consumers’ Paychecks, Federal Trade
Commission (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/09/payday.shtm (last
visited Jan. 25, 2012) (recounting recent FTC suits against payday lenders who
illegally attempted to garnish borrowers’ wages) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
226. Id.
227. See id. The FTC alleges that these lenders illegally revealed consumers’
unproven debts to their employers and deprived consumers of their right to
dispute the debts or make payment arrangements. Id. The complaint further
alleges that lenders misrepresented to employers that the defendants are legally
authorized to garnish an employee’s wages, without first obtaining a court
order; falsely represented to employers that the defendants have notified
consumers about the pending garnishment and have given them an opportunity
to dispute the debt; unfairly disclosed the existence and the amounts of
consumers’ supposed debts to employers and co-workers without the consumers’
knowledge or consent; violated the FTC’s Credit Practices Rule by requiring
consumers taking out payday loans to consent to have wages taken directly out
of their paychecks in the event of a default; and violated the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act and Regulation E by requiring authorization for electronic
payments from their bank account as a condition of obtaining payday loans. Id.
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for so-called short-term loans that are in reality far from short-term.
This task, if it is to be taken on, is most likely to be tackled by the
new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).228

2. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Could Act
a. The General Powers of the CFPB
Leaving aside the issue of whether Congress might act to limit
sovereign immunity, Congress already has spoken on the issue of
regulating payday loans in general.229 On July 21, 2010, the Dodd–
Frank Act went into effect, which in turn created the CFPB.230
While the CFPB cannot set interest rate caps, it clearly has the
authority to regulate payday loans in other ways. It also appears
that the CFPB has the power to jettison the tribal-affiliation
loophole.231
228. This assumes that federal agencies have the power to regulate tribes,
an issue about which there is current disagreement. For example, in a case
dealing with the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), administered by
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, see Donovan v. Navajo
Forest Products Industries, 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that OSHA
was not applicable to the Navajo in derogation of the treaty-granted exclusivity)
and Department of Labor v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n,
935 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.1991) (holding the opposite with regards to a sawmill
owned by the Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs).
229. This section of the Article borrows extensively from Nathalie Martin,
Regulating Payday Loans: Why This Should Make the CFPB’S Short List, 2
HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 44 (2011).
230. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
H.R. 4173, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010).
231. This is not altogether clear. Under the Constitution, Congress is
granted power over Indian affairs. Congress is, of course, the legislative branch,
whereas the CPFB—and all agencies—are created by Congress but fall under
the executive branch. At times, the courts have claimed that even Congress
must be explicit in its intention to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. See
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). At other times, it seems
that the presumption is that congressional Acts of general applicability are
applicable to Native Americans. See Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751
F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985). With regard to regulatory agencies: the EPA, for
instance, has been authorized by Congress through specific amendments to
treat tribes as states with regard to most environmental statutes. In short, the
question is what Congress has said in the Dodd–Frank Act itself, and how
explicitly Congress said it. See Dodd–Frank Act. § 1024 (a)(1). If the CFPB’s
regulations are strongly pro-consumer (and after all, the purpose of the agency
is to protect consumers), preemption of state laws should become less of an issue
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Generally speaking, the CFPB is charged with policing
activities relating to financial products and services for unfair,
deceptive, and abusive acts or practices,232 and routinely examining
non-depository entities for compliance with federal consumer
financial laws.233 The agency has general authority to monitor
financial products and services for risks to consumers,234 and as part
of this monitoring function, it may require lenders to file reports and
participate in interviews and surveys, and also may gather
information from consumers.235 More importantly, the Act
specifically prohibits all unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or
practices by covered persons and their service providers.236 The
CFPB is thus given broad power to make rules and take
enforcement action with respect to any “unfair, deceptive, or abusive
act or practice . . . in connection with any transaction with a

because the federal laws will be more rather than less protective that state laws.
See Jared Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protection: How
the Dodd–Frank Act Changes the Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1273, 1273,
1286–87. Moreover, if a state law is more protective, the CFPB regulation will
not preempt it. Id.
232. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(2); see also H.R. 4173 § 1021(b)(2).
233. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5512(a) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1022(a). The CFPB has
become the administrator for all “federal consumer financial laws,” which
include nearly every existing federal consumer financial statute, as well as new
consumer financial protection mandates prescribed by the Act. 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 5481(14) (2012); see also H.R. 4173 § 1002(14). Thus, the CFPB has the
exclusive authority to promulgate regulations, issue orders, and provide
guidance to administer the federal consumer financial laws.
234. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5512(c)(1) (2012); see also H.R. 4173 § 1022(c)(2)(A).
235. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5512(c)(4)(B)(i) (2012); 12 U.S.C.A. § 5516(b), (c) (2012);
12 U.S.C.A. § 5531 (2012); see also H.R. 4173 §§ 1022(c)(4)(B)(1), 1026(b), (c),
1031.
236. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5536 (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1036; see also 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 5481(6) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1002(6) (defining a “covered person” as “(A) any
person that engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or
service; and (B) any affiliate of a person described in subparagraph (A) if such
affiliate acts as a service provider to such person.”). A “service provider” is a
person that provides a material service to a covered person in connection with
the offering or provision of a consumer financial product or service. 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 5481(26) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1002(26). Service providers also may be subject to
CFPB supervision. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5514(e) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1024(e). Under the
Act, “person” “means an individual, partnership, company, corporation,
association (incorporated or unincorporated), trust, estate, cooperative
organization, or other entity.” 12 U.S.C.A. § 5481(19) (2012); H.R. 4173
§ 1002(19).
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consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the offering
of a consumer financial product or service.”237
An act or practice is considered “unfair” if it is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers that cannot be reasonably avoided
by consumers, whenever this substantial injury is not outweighed
by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.238 An act
or practice can be deemed abusive in two different ways. First, it can
be found to be abusive if it materially interferes with the ability of a
consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial
product or service.239 Second, an act can be found to be abusive if it
takes unreasonable advantage of one of three things:
1. a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service; or
2. the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the
consumer in selecting or using consumer financial products or
services, and
3. the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to
act in the interests of the consumer.240

“Abusive” is defined broadly to include situations in which the
consumer lacks understanding of a consumer financial product,
particularly where a covered person’s acts or omissions contribute to
this lack of understanding.241 This definition might even apply to
disallow complicated disclosure terms, the provision of terms that
are not translated to the native language of a consumer, or even an
agreement that the consumer fully understands, but that the CFPB
237. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531(a) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1031(a).
238. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531(c)(1) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1031(c)(1). Because this is a
consumer protection statute, even the benefit to competition must benefit
consumers.
239. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531(d)(1) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1031(d)(1).
240. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531(d)(2) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1031(d)(2). The CFPA
does not define the term “deceptive,” so the meaning of “deceptive” may be
construed under § 5 of the FTC Act and the regulations and other guidance of
the FTC. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(4)(A) (2012). The Senate report states that the
existing law prohibits unfair and deceptive practices, suggesting that the term
is used with the same meaning here. S. Rep. No. 111-176 (2010).
241. Michael B. Mierzewski, Beth S. DeSimone, Jeremy W. Hochberg &
Brian P. Larkin, The Dodd–Frank Act Establishes the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection as the Primary Regulator of Consumer Financial Products
and Services, 127 BANKING L. J. 722, 730 (2010).
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feels is not reasonably in the consumer’s interest.242 Depending on
how the CFPB interprets the definition of “abusive,” payday lending
could be forbidden entirely.243
b. The CFPB and Payday Lending in General
As set out in the prior section, the CFPB can ban outright any
product that is either unfair or abusive. The CFPB can also regulate
all products that have the potential to be abusive or unfair.244
Payday loans arguably fall within both categories.245 Because these
loans are most frequently used by people of lesser means246 for nonemergencies,247 the loans can cause substantial injury that is not
242. Id.
243. Id. Covered persons and their service providers are also required to
maintain and share information about their practices with the CFPB. 12
U.S.C.A. § 5536(a)(2) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1036(a)(2). Furthermore, “[a]ny
person” who knowingly or recklessly provides “substantial assistance” to covered
persons and service providers who violate these prohibitions will be equally
liable for the violation. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5536(a)(3) (2012); H.R. 4173
§ 1036(a)(3). Disclosures must be provided not just at the time of the initial loan,
but over the term of the relationship, and these disclosures must allow
consumers “to understand the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the
product or service.” 12 U.S.C.A. § 5532(a) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1032(a). Form
disclosures must contain “plain language comprehensible to consumers,” have “a
clear format and design,” explain necessary information “succinctly,” and “be
validated through consumer testing.” 12 U.S.C.A. § 5532(b)(2)–(3) (2012); H.R.
4173 § 1032(b)(2)–(3). Large fines can be assessed for non-compliance with these
requirements. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5565(c) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1055(c).
244. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 5511 (2012) (outlining the purposes and
objectives of the CFPB).
245. A practice or product is unfair if it is likely to cause substantial injury
to consumers that cannot be reasonably avoided, whenever this substantial
injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.
12 U.S.C.A. § 5531(c) (2012). While consumers could arguably avoid substantial
injury from payday loans by using them less frequently and not rolling them
over, the CFPB could still target payday lenders for unfair or abusive practices
because such lenders rely on tactics that hinder these potential protective
measures by consumers and instead make sure consumers use their products
continuously.
246. Francis, supra note 25, at 613; see also John P. Caskey, supra note 33,
at 3 (noting that payday lenders serve people of lesser means but not the very
poor).
247. See Martin, supra note 27, at 608–09 (showing that few payday
borrowers said they used the loans for emergency expenses; most used the loans
for regular bills).

PAYDAY LENDERS AND TRIBES

797

outweighed by a countervailing benefit. Enforcing this part of the
Act requires the CFPB to ask specifically whether the loan’s cost is
worth what the consumer pays for it over the full life of the loan.248
Lending practices suggest that lenders do take unreasonable
advantage of consumers’ lack of knowledge of the loan terms.249
Lenders also encourage borrowing whenever possible and
discourage paying off the loans.250
Customers also have various behavioral biases, including
optimism bias and framing.251 There is also much more at stake for
248. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531 (2012). A product is abusive if it “materially
interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a
consumer financial product or service” or “takes unreasonable advantage” of one
of the following: (1) “a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service”; (2) “the inability of
the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in selecting or using a
consumer financial product or service”; or (3) “the reasonable reliance by the
consumer on a covered person to act in the interests of the consumer.” Id.
§ 5531(d). Only one of these three conditions is required to find an act or product
abusive, and in this instance at least two of the three conditions are satisfied.
249. There is tremendous subterfuge of the actual terms of payday loans, as
is true in so many consumer-lending contexts today. Yet subterfuge in payday
lending causes more individual harm than subterfuge in other contexts. It is
difficult to calculate the actual costs of these products over time, up front, given
that the loans are short term and interest-only, but usually renewed and rolled
into a new loan.
250. This is particularly a problem with internet payday loans, in which the
lender often just takes out the interest on the loan automatically, creating no
easy way to pay off the whole loan. See CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., CFA SURVEY OF
ONLINE PAYDAY LOAN WEBSITES 9 (reporting on a 2011 study and stating that
online loans are often structured to automatically withdraw only the finance
charge and continue the loan for another pay cycle). Nor is this a new problem.
A 2004 study by the Consumer Federation of America explains how this is done,
which was then described on a government web site:
Although loans are due on the borrower's next payday, many
surveyed sites automatically renew the loan, withdrawing the finance
charge from the borrower's bank account and extending the loan for
another pay cycle. Sixty-five [of 100] of the surveyed sites permit loan
renewals with no reduction in principal. At some lenders, consumers
have to take additional steps to actually repay the loan. After several
renewals, some lenders require borrowers to reduce the loan principal
with each renewal.
Robert Longley, Consumers Warned of Online Payday Loan Sites, ABOUT.GOV
U.S. GOVERNMENT INFO, http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/consumerawareness/a/pay
dayloans.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
251. Regarding the influence of framing, because consumers are used to
hearing interest rates stated in terms of twenty to twenty-five percent, they
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them in taking out these loans, which ultimately represent a huge
percentage of their overall cash flow. The costs are high by any
standard, but by the average payday loan customer’s standard, they
are excessive beyond imagination.252
Another step the CFPB can take is to conclusively prohibit the
use of wage assignments and demand drafts for payday loans,
closing one arguable loophole in the Electronic Funds Transfer
Act.253
c. The CFPB and Tribes
The CFPB applies to Native Americans as consumers. It was
formed to protect all Americans from abusive lending practices.254
The U.S. Treasury’s web site contains a detailed memo regarding
how the CFPB applies to Native Americans and why the issue is
important.255 Though this memo does not carry the force of law, it is
an indication of the CFPB’s intent. As the Treasury memo explains,
Native Americans are more likely to use alternative financial
services than other Americans.256
believe that twenty percent over two weeks also equals twenty percent per
annum.
252. Additionally, consumers cannot protect their interests because the true
terms of the loans are often hidden from consumers at the point of sale. Finally,
consumers cannot protect their interests because all of the products are offered
under the same or similar unfavorable terms. The market is simply not working.
Considering all of the above, it is hard to picture a product more likely to fit
within these definitions of unfair and abusive than a payday loan.
253. See, e.g., Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1693(a).
254. Some commentators suspect that the CFPB will focus on store-front
payday lenders while continuing to ignore tribally-affiliated internet lenders.
See Natasha Mayer, The Free-Market Bandits, THE DAILY CALLER (Feb. 23, 2011,
2:58 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2011/02/22/the-free-market-bandits/ (last visited
Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
255. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act Benefits Native Americans (Jan. 26, 2011),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Pages/Native-Americans.aspx
(last
visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
256. The Treasury memorandum further explains the applicability of the
CFPB’s regulations to Native families:
For Native American families using alternative financial
services: The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
establishes, for the first time, robust federal supervision and
oversight over larger alternative financial service companies such as
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Moreover, as established in Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal
Farm,257 and other cases,258 federal regulations apply to Native
American tribes and may be enforced by the federal government. In
Coeur d’Alene, the Coeur D’Alene Tribe argued that it was not
subject to Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
requirements as a result of tribal immunity.259 The Tribe operated a
farm that produced grain and lentils for sale on the open market,
and employed both tribal and non-tribal members.260 After an
inspection, the Tribe was cited for twenty-one violations of OSHA.261
The farm did not dispute the facts but argued that OSHA did not
apply to them because of tribal immunity.262
check cashers and payday lenders, including on reservations. The
CFPB will be able to combat abusive practices that harm consumers,
helping families avoid hidden fees and keep more money in their
pocketbooks.
Id. As for minorities in general, an analysis of the 2007 Survey of Consumer
Finances by the Center for American Progress found that “[t]hirty-eight percent
of families who has borrowed a payday loan within the last year were nonwhite
while just twenty-two percent of families who did not take out such a loan were
nonwhite.” Amanda Logan and Christian E. Weller, Who Borrows From Payday
Lenders?: An Analysis of Newly Available Data, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS (March 2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
2009/03/pdf/payday_lending.pdf. As for Native Americans specifically, a survey
of attendees at a National American Indian Housing Council meeting found that
at least half of respondents believed that the following alternative financial
services were a problem in their communities: loans against tax refunds (sixtyeight percent), payday loans (sixty-seven percent), pawn shops (fifty-eight
percent), and car title loans (fifty percent).
257. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding that the OSHA applied to commercial activities carried on by an Indian
tribal farm).
258. See Florida Paraplegic Ass’n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 166 F.3d
1126, 1127, 1129–30 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying the Americans with Disabilities
Act to a tribal restaurant and holding that although private suit was barred by
sovereign immunity, the Attorney General of the United States could bring
actions against the tribe); San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 475 F.3d 1306
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (construing the National Labor Relations Act as applying to
tribe); Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying
Employee Retirement Income Security Act to group insurance policy issued to
Indian-owned hospital); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA, 803 F.2d 545, 547 (10th
Cir. 1986) (finding that the Safe Drinking Water Act may be imposed in Indian
country).
259. Donovan, 751 F.2d at 1115.
260. Id. at 1114.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1114–15.
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Holding that generally applicable federal law applies equally to
tribes and everyone else, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
established three exceptions to the rule.263 The court held that a
“federal statute of general applicability that is silent on the issue of
applicability to Indian tribes” will not apply to tribes if: “(1) the law
touches ‘exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural
matters’; (2) the application of the law to the tribe would ‘abrogate
rights guaranteed by Indian treaties’; or (3) there is proof ‘by
legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the
law] not to apply to Indians on their reservations.’”264 In any of these
three situations, Congress must expressly state that a law applies to
native people before the court will apply that law to native
communities or individuals.265
i. Interference with Tribal Self-Government
The first prong of the Coeur d’Alene test asks whether the
applicability of the federal law in question would interfere with
rights of tribal self-government.266 If so, the federal law cannot be
applied to tribes unless there is a “clear” expression of congressional
intent that the law should apply to tribes.267 In Coeur d’Alene,
applying OSHA, the court found that interpreting this exception as
broadly as the tribe argued would except all tribal businesses from
federal regulation. The court stated:
[I]f the right to conduct commercial enterprises free of federal
regulation is an aspect of tribal self-government, so too, it would
seem, is the right to run a tribal enterprise free of the potentially
ruinous burden of federal taxes. Yet our cases make clear that
federal taxes apply to reservation activities even without a “clear”
expression of congressional intent.268

The court went on to say, “we believe that the tribal self-government
exception is designed to except purely intramural matters such as
conditions of tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 1115–16.
Id. at 1116 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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relations from the general rule that otherwise applicable federal
statutes apply to Indian tribes” engaging in regulated open market
commerce.269
ii. The “Treaty Rights” Exception
The tribe next argued that OSHA cannot apply to a tribe’s
activities absent a clear expression of congressional intent because
application of the Act would infringe on treaty rights.270 Because the
court found no treaty at all between the Coeur d’Alene tribe and the
United States, it found that the second exception did not apply
either.271
iii. The “Other Indications” Exception
As set out above, if neither of the first two exceptions apply,
there is a third, catch-all exception for situations in which Congress
expressed explicit intent that the law not apply to tribes.272 This
exception asks whether the legislative history surrounding the law
in question (in Coeur d’Alene it was OSHA) indicates any
congressional desire to exclude tribal enterprises from the scope of
its coverage.273 This exception requires that there be express intent
to exclude tribes.
In applying Coeur d’Alene to the CFPB’s regulations, there is no
question that the Dodd–Frank Act that created the CFPB is a law of
general applicability. This means the CFPB’s regulations apply as
long as none of the three exceptions set out in Coeur d’Alene
apply.274 None of these exceptions appear to apply to internet
payday lending. As in Coeur d’Alene, the business in question here
is in regular commerce, and there is nothing about regulating
payday lending that bears upon tribal membership, inheritance
269. Id. The tribe also argued that the inspector’s presence interfered with
the tribe’s immunity, but the Court disagreed. See id. at 1116–17.
270. Id. at 1117.
271. Id. at 1117–18.
272. Id. at 1116.
273. Id. at 1118.
274. Id. at 1115–16.
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rules, and domestic relations, or any other internal governance
matter.275 Moreover, unlike Coeur d’Alene, there is no intrusion onto
tribal land at all, as the CFPB will likely be regulating internet
lending, not store-front lending.276 As to prong two, like Coeur
d’Alene, at least in the cases identified thus far, there is no treaty
between the United States and the tribes involved in internet
payday lending. Finally, there is no express intent here for the
CFPB to exclude tribes or native people. To the contrary, as the
Treasury memorandum indicates, there was express intent for the
exact opposite, namely, for the CFPB to apply equally to tribes and
everyone else.277
In summary, federal laws of general application apply to tribes
and can be enforced by the federal government unless one of the
Coeur d’Alene factors applies.278 Thus, if nothing else, the CFPB is
in a position to outlaw or limit internet payday lending in general,
regardless of who is doing the lending. Given the difficulties created
by the sovereign immunity model, as well as off-shore lending
models, the role of the CFPB is critical.
The CFPB’s investigative powers could also be very useful to
the offices of state attorneys general in thwarting the overarching
participation of non-immune, non-tribal financiers (such as Mr.
Tucker) in this market, who should be targeted. State attorneys
general will have access to CFPB investigations of tribes pursuant
to memoranda of understanding required by Dodd-Frank to pursue
the non-tribal financiers of tribal lending entities under state law as
aiders, abettors, conspirators, or control persons.
Tribal immunity does not make tribal lending in contravention
of state law legal, but it does make tribes immune from prosecution.
It will likely be more effective for attorneys general to not join the
tribes as defendants in order to pursue non-tribal defendants in
illegal lending schemes. Using the CFPB’s investigative and
enforcement actions, no change in law or interpretation is required
275. Id. at 1116 (explaining that the tribal self-government exception is
intended to apply to matters such as those listed in the text above).
276. As the court noted, the regulators would not need to enter reservation
land, but even if they did, this would not be not interference under Coeur
d’Alene. See id. at 1116–17.
277. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 256.
278. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 282–
86 (4th ed. 2004).
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for this attorney general action to take place. The CFPB, however,
would need to take an immediate and active role in investigating
online payday lending.
VII. Conclusion: Who Loses When Sovereignty Is Sold?
Sovereignty is the linchpin of tribal self-determination.279
Scholars are already concerned that broadening sovereign
immunity to off-reservation business enterprises will cause the
Supreme Court and Congress to limit that immunity, particularly
where the immunity extends to non-Indians.280 Indeed, the
Supreme Court may already be reevaluating its stance toward tribal
immunity,281 a step in the wrong direction for tribes.282 There has
been marked and insidious erosion in tribal sovereignty as it relates
to tribal territory since Kiowa. This development is so pronounced
that it might outweigh the significant benefits tribal economic
development has brought to tribes.283 Tribal payday lending could
further erode this sovereignty.
Courts, litigants, and scholars continue to challenge the
fairness of corporate immunity for casinos and other businesses that
compete in the economic mainstream.284 Thus far, the Supreme
Court has somewhat begrudgingly continued to recognize broad
tribal immunity in the commercial context, though the precise
parameters of sovereign immunity in the business context remain
undefined. Tribes need not allow these parameters to lie in the
279. See S. Chloe Thompson, Exercising and Protecting Tribal Sovereignty in
Day-to-Day Business Operations: What the Key Players Need to Know, 49
WASHBURN L.J. 661, 661 (2010).
280. See id. at 661–662; Kunesh, supra note 138, at 398; Charles Trimble,
Sovereignty for Rent with Payday Loan Businesses, INDIANZ.COM (Mar. 14, 2011),
http://64.38.12.138/News/2011/000756.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
281. See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The
Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J.
1, 7 (1999); David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1573, 1574
(1996); Sarah Krakoff, The Virtues and Vices of Sovereignty, 38 CONN. L. REV.
797, 797 (2006); Kunesh, supra note 138, at 398.
282. Getches, supra note 281, at 1574.
283. Thompson, supra note 279, at 661.
284. Id. at 664–65.
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hands of random courts, the Supreme Court, or Congress. Rather,
they can take things into their own hands and regulate or forbid
payday lending by their members and corporate entities.
Tension about the extent of tribal sovereign immunity is
evident in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. For example in
Kiowa, Justice Stevens’s dissent expressed serious doubts about the
legal premise and fairness of tribal immunity from suit for offreservation commercial activities.285 Justice Stevens claimed that
sovereign immunity in the context of commercial activity is unjust,
adding that “[g]overnments, like individuals, should pay their debts
and should be held accountable for their unlawful, injurious
conduct.”286
Some tribal members recognize the risk in selling sovereignty
too cheaply. As Charles Trimble, a member of the Oglala Sioux
tribe, stated on his popular Native American blog:
[Payday lending] is fodder for those forces that still argue that
tribes are not up to the standards of discipline and law for
sovereignty and self-governance. Instead they are seen by many
as havens of corruption and lawlessness, and fronts for sleazy
businesses. These are the things that could feed a backlash; and
as I have written before, even if our sovereignty is secure, those
forces could make it more difficult to exercise it for the good of our
people.
For example, anti-tribal forces could push Congress to just extend
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act’s requirement for state-tribal
compacts for other non-gaming businesses. Or ultra-conservative
budget cutters could use the excuse of not wanting to promote
state law circumvention by subsidizing the payday lenders
through the tribes.287

He added that “[t]here is great dignity in sovereignty and great
discipline is needed for its preservation.”288 Similarly, Professor
Patrice Kunesh suggests that tribes remain mindful that
“improvident use of tribal sovereign immunity may impede
actualization of full tribal self-determination and obstruct ultimate
tribal vindication of important legal rights.”289 With immunity
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760–66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 766.
Trimble, supra note 280.
Id.
See Kunesh, supra note 138, at 416; see also Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal

PAYDAY LENDERS AND TRIBES

805

comes great power, which, if overused, can backfire.290 Given the
power of Congress, the Supreme Court, the FTC, and the CFPB,
tribes may find good reasons to steer clear of these partnerships
entirely, or to closely regulate them.

Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 777, 791 (2006)
(“Militant and inflexible assertions of tribal sovereignty may be emotionally
satisfying, and they may, frankly, be more consistent with fundamental notions
of truth and justice. But strong expressions of ‘sovereignty’ seem to come up
hollow in so many Supreme Court cases.”).
290. Another commentator, who represents tribes in various business
enterprises, adds further suggestions and cautions. Recognizing that
sovereignty is more likely challenged when tribes have different laws than the
rest of society, she suggests that when enacting laws, tribes consider enacting
laws similar to those found in the rest of society. See Thompson, supra note 279,
at 679–80. Doing so will result in less conflict of laws analyses as well as fewer
overall immunity challenges and thus less risk of further chipping away at
immunity. Id. at 680. Next she recommends that when enacting laws, tribes try
to enact laws that are facially fair and reasonable because this too will reduce
the likelihood that sovereign immunity claims will arise. Id. at 681–82. Finally,
and more relevant here, she recommends that tribes concerned with protecting
immunity think very hard about when such immunity should apply to non-tribal
members. Stating that applying immunity to non-members “increases the
likelihood of challenges to the Tribe’s authority,” she suggests serious thought
about when to take such actions. Id. at 682. Professor Kunesh advises that any
sovereign immunity be used with “fairness, responsiveness and transparency.”
Kunesh, supra note 138, at 416. Noting how fact-specific sovereign immunity
can be, she adds that “in this complex legal and policy-orientated matrix, every
variable matters. The status of the parties and their political and legal
relationship to the tribe, such as tribal member, nonmember, reservation
resident or itinerant patron, business partner or financier must be considered.”
Id. at 418.

